In the Euro-Atlantic equation, the fate of Ukraine here and now and the strengthening of Europe’s first line of defense, from the Atlantic to the Don Basin, are far more important than the removal of Maduro and the Trump administration’s focus on the “Western Hemisphere.” This is especially true given that the affair will have repercussions on U.S.-Russian relations. More worrying is the issue of Greenland, the outcome of which is vital for the future of NATO. Without sacrificing their principles, European states must devise a major diplomatic and strategic maneuver to preserve what is essential.
Taken in isolation, the U.S. raid in Venezuela and the capture of the Maduro couple do not, in our view, mark a tipping point that would turn the world upside down. On the one hand, this is not a historic first in the post-1945 era, which of course is not enough to justify this type of action (there is always a precedent that is supposed to set a legal precedent). On the other hand, doing nothing and letting Maduro continue to rule also violated international law, which is not monolithic. Far more worrying are Donald Trump’s views on Greenland
A territory four times the size of France
With an area of 2.166 million sq km, Greenland (“Green Land”) is a territory four times the size of France, 85% of which is covered in ice. The local population numbers only 57,000, making it one of the least densely populated territories in the world. Since 1921, Greenland has been attached to Denmark, which constitutes an institutional link with Europe, without the territory being an integral part of the European Union (the inhabitants of Greenland voted against this in a referendum). Geologically, it is linked to North America, a fact emphasized by American supporters of annexation.
On the other hand, Greenland is a member of NATO, which raises the question of what would happen to it if the leader of this alliance were to take an unfortunate military initiative1. Secretary of State Marco Rubio dismisses this possibility, while Jeff Landry, the U.S. special envoy to the large island, believes that the lure of financial gain alone could be enough to convince Greenlanders to come under U.S. sovereignty. However, Donald Trump continues to refuse to rule out military coercion to achieve his ends. This is against the expectations and preferences of the vast majority of Americans, even among his own electorate.
During World War II, while Denmark was occupied by German troops, the United States took charge of Greenland’s future, whose geostrategic position was important in the “Battle of the Atlantic” (i.e., naval and submarine warfare operations and submarine operations for control of the North Atlantic between 1939 and 1945). Its importance was such that U.S. President Harry Truman, at the beginning of the Cold War, was (already) considering purchasing Greenland. In any case, the United States obtained from Denmark, a NATO member, the right to install military bases on the island, including the Thule base (deployment of strategic bombers) and a station to monitor possible Soviet strategic missile launches (ICBMs). The American system was reorganized after the Cold War, and Thule Air Base was subsequently renamed “Pituffik” (2023); it is now part of the space branch of the U.S. Armed Forces. In reality, the base is an essential component of the U.S. missile defense system.
Meanwhile, the demand for autonomy among the inhabitants of Greenland is growing. Since the consultative referendum on autonomy on November 25, 2008 (75% in favor), Greenland has enjoyed expanded autonomy, with significant consequences in terms of natural resources: a form of quasi-sovereignty that accommodates a freeze (no pun intended) on virtually all exploitation of its subsoil and seabed.
In addition to expectations regarding the exploitation of fossil resources—the U.S. Geological Survey estimates that Greenland has reserves equivalent to half of those of Saudi Arabia, or about 10% of global reserves— Greenland also has significant deposits of rare earth elements, minerals that are essential to digital technologies and the famous “energy transition” (which is not Donald Trump’s primary concern).
A large degree of autonomy
The Autonomy Act has been in force since May 2009: Sovereign powers (diplomacy and defense) are still exercised from Copenhagen, but the territory’s evolution toward independence is presented as inevitable. In addition to financial transfers from Denmark, Greenland’s economy is based on natural resources and fishing (95% of exports). Greenland’s resources are attracting the attention of major investors, particularly those from China. From Beijing’s perspective, establishing a presence in Greenland through various investments and agreements with the autonomous government would also be a way of positioning itself in the race for Arctic resources and the exploitation of new polar routes (the Northwest and Northeast Passages). Greenland is a member of the Nordic Council, but it participates in the Council of Arctic States through Denmark, a structure that has been dormant due to the new Cold War between Russia and the West2.
It appears that the prospect of an independent Greenland is giving rise to significant rivalries, which were once hidden but are now out in the open. At Washington’s request, the Danish government was able to thwart China’s desire to gain control of ports and airfields on the island, but there are fears that an independent Greenland would give in to Beijing’s offers. This is all the more likely given that the Sino-Russian alliance and the cooperation it entails also extend to the Arctic Ocean. In addition to the resources of this large island, it is important to bear in mind its geostrategic importance, both for controlling new polar sea routes and for monitoring the passage of Russian submarines in the North Atlantic (the “GIUK Gap”).
Greed and a spirit of plunder
Donald Trump’s mention during his first presidential term of the United States buying Greenland (2019) was a sign of tensions to come, but the idea seemed far-fetched. Trump’s renewed offer on January 7, 2025, accompanied by a threat of conflict, commercial or otherwise, with Denmark, gives more substance and urgency to the Greenland issue. Moreover, it is not certain that Donald Trump’s harsh tone and the simplistic nature of the proposed solution (purchasing the territory, as in times past) are the most appropriate response to the situation: geopolitics cannot be reduced to real estate promotion methods, and such rhetoric will have repercussions on the power and influence of the United States even among its closest allies (Donald Trump does not care, but the world is bigger than his psyche). In contrast to commercial discourse, the discourse of pure force, and its glorification as a formula for legitimacy, will have counterproductive effects and, in the long run, will undermine the foundations of American power: the spirit of plunder and short-term gains will not replace a grand strategy, which is non-existent at this stage: the National Security Strategy, 2025 NSS, is a manifesto revealing Donald Trump’s worldview and his deep motivations, not a real strategy. Even less so is the cheap Nietzscheanism of some “accelerationists” and other aficionados of “Dark Enlightenment.” One might also think that Copenhagen’s break with “decolonialism” and the clear reaffirmation of Danish sovereignty over Greenland, in agreement with the United States and its European allies, would be the surest way to safeguard the future of the large island. How can we believe that independence would be viable and would protect Greenland from Russian and Chinese ambitions? This prospect can only fuel Trumpist ambitions. As for the European states as a whole, they need to prioritize, support Ukraine, and address the Russian threat to the continent, a threat that goes beyond the “hybrid war” that is constantly being talked about. To do this, U.S. support remains crucial in the short and medium term, as highlighted by the negotiation of a transatlantic agreement on security guarantees for Ukraine and the U.S. “safety net” required for a hypothetical European “Reassurance Force” (a mainly Franco-British force deployed on the ground if a ceasefire agreement were signed).In addition to the essential diplomatic action across the Atlantic and the lobbying that must be carried out with Congress, elected officials on both sides who are hostile to military intervention in Greenland, and all centers of power and influence in the United States, it is important that Denmark, its European allies and partners, and the European Union as such, agree on an Arctic strategy that would combine a greater contribution to Greenland’s security, in cooperation with the United States, and the development of this large island’s resources. If reason prevails, there would certainly be room for a compromise that would satisfy all stakeholders. At the very least, we must take action and give it a try.
Conclusion
Finally, European states must urgently shake off their stupor and realize that a form of hegemonic warfare is underway on a global scale. This is a fact. Lamenting the law, which without force is reduced to morality, and invoking the “liberal international order” will not suffice: the law does not impose itself, and compliance with a number of rules, however desirable, presupposes the existence of geopolitical conditions that have disappeared. Let us guard against a constructivist and voluntarist, and therefore artificial, discourse that would position Europe as a third power, capable of doing without the United States and preventing the world from tipping over, through its exemplary nature and high morality. Such discourse is counterfactual: Europe is not a global geostrategic player.It is important to bear in mind the verses of Archilochus of Paros (7th Century BC), meditated upon by Isaiah Berlin, on the hedgehog and the fox: “The fox knows many things and the hedgehog knows only one, but it is great.“ The exercise is not to pit the ”hedgehog,“ focused on a grand design to the point of disregarding the constraints on action, against the “fox,” concerned with responding to stimuli in its environment, but to combine these two styles of strategic reasoning: carefully defining political and strategic objectives; aligning ends and means. The formation of a pan-European entity capable of standing together and acting independently will require continued and multifaceted support for Ukraine, the political and military rebalancing of the Atlantic Alliance, and the overcoming of incapacitating nostalgia.
Associate professor of history and geography and researcher at the French Institute of Geopolitics (University of Paris VIII). Author of several books, he works within the Thomas More Institute on geopolitical and defense issues in Europe. His research areas cover the Baltic-Black Sea region, post-Soviet Eurasia, and the Mediterranean.
Footnotes
- If the U.S. were to attack a NATO country, it would be the end of “everything,” warned Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen on 01/05/ 2026.
- On the issues at stake in the Arctic region, see my article “Confronting the Moscow-Beijing Axis: The Need for a Common Western Front in the Arctic,” Desk Russie, 01/29/2025