Confronting the Moscow-Beijing Axis: The Need for a Common Western Front in the Arctic

On January 7, 2025, a few days before his inauguration, Donald Trump reaffirmed his interest in Greenland, a vast autonomous territory under Danish sovereignty. While the American president’s rhetoric should not always be taken literally, it should be taken seriously in this case. In fact, Greenland covers a number of geopolitical issues, and is of interest to China, whose alliance with Russia also involves polar routes and regions. In short, “ This is the Arctic, stupid!” That’s why it’s so important for Western nations to join forces in the Arctic and promote a “Free North” initiative, as part of a broader perspective.

The interest of the USA and other powers in the Arctic region, even if they do not border it, is part of a general trend toward greater attention being paid to this part of the globe. According to a number of forward-looking studies, the Arctic Ocean and its coastal regions could constitute a new frontier for the world’s oil and gas economy. The areas under consideration extend beyond the Arctic Circle (66°, 34′) and cover some ten million km², four times the size of the Mediterranean. The partial melting of the summer ice pack – an area of fifteen million km² in winter, and six to seven million km² in summer – raises new energy, logistical and economic issues, with major geopolitical repercussions. The issues at stake are many and include territorial questions (disputes between Canada and Denmark over Hans Island), the status of maritime passages (territorial waters for coastal states, international waters for others), the extension of continental shelves and the delimitation of maritime zones (a central question for hydrocarbon development), and the opening up of new maritime routes between Europe and Asia, i.e. the “Northwest” and “Northeast” passages¹.

The many challenges of the Arctic

These issues are closely intertwined, as illustrated by oil and gas questions: the status of islands and islets and the delimitation of maritime zones determine ownership rights and the exploitation of deposits; the evacuation of extracted resources will then bring into play the status of maritime passages and the interest of new routes. According to estimates produced by the US Geological Survey (USGS), the Arctic regions could contain 20-25% of the world’s unproven oil and gas reserves (13% for oil and 30% for gas). However, the reported figures are uncertain, and exploiting these resources would pose major safety issues. Whatever the climate “scenario”, these areas will remain polar regions, marked by extreme conditions. In the event of an oil spill, it would be difficult to carry out operations in the middle of the pack ice, with no logistical infrastructure or deep harbor nearby, in the midst of a polar night and in extreme cold. Nevertheless, major energy companies are working together on high-tech programs to meet the challenge of such risks. Research and contracts include high-resolution satellite monitoring of pack ice movements, and there are plans to use submarines to detect any oil leaks under the pack ice. The aim is to develop operational solutions to pave the way for the exploitation of Arctic resources. Until a few years ago, the doxa was that all these issues should be tackled cooperatively, within the framework of the Arctic Council².

Despite the uncertainties and obstaclees, Russia, the main Arctic littoral state, cannot but attach growing importance to this part of the world, which is now the subject of a specific strategy (“Strategy for the development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation and the guarantee of national security until 2035”, 2020). For Moscow, the stakes are not just nuclear deterrence (see the arsenal on the Kola Peninsula), or the security of the Arctic coastline (17,500 kilometers of coastline out of a total of 38,000 kilometers). Russia’s “grand strategy” looks further ahead, and takes into account the traffic issues linked to the impact of climate change on the pack ice. This could facilitate the famous Northeast Passage, as the “Northern Sea Route” opened by the Soviets between the world wars is set to become a major waterway between Europe and Asia, in competition with the Suez and Panama routes³. Added to this are possession issues linked to the extension of Russia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the Arctic (see claims over the Lomonosov Ridge and the North Pole, totalling 1.2 million km²), which would give it control over considerable resources.

Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, a coastal state can extend its jurisdiction over the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles (370 km) of its EEZ, provided it can prove that the area is continuous with its territory. Its first request was rejected in 2001, but in 2007 it planted its flag 4,200 meters below the North Pole, without this gesture having any legal value. In August 2015, Russia presented its maritime claims to the United Nations Commission in charge of these issues, following in the footsteps of Canada in 2013 and Denmark in 2014. Since then, it has won a discreet victory in the legal battle over the Arctic seabed. Indeed, the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) has already approved many of Russia’s claims to the seabed in the central Arctic Ocean.

Admittedly, the stakes and opportunities for exploiting Arctic resources may be exaggerated. On the one hand, fluctuations in hydrocarbon prices, in addition to Western sanctions, are having a negative impact on the exploitation of deposits in Russia’s Far North. On the other hand, regardless of global warming, the Northeast Passage will remain limited by the long polar night and the resulting six months of pack ice (the period is even longer beyond New Zealand). In addition, the formation of convoys behind icebreakers would severely restrict the speed of container ships using this new sea route between Europe and Asia, resulting in a loss of competitiveness. Last but not least, the major shipping routes used by container ships include several ports of call, where “crates” are loaded and unloaded, which determines their profitability: this would not be the case along the Siberian coast of the Arctic. In short, the interest of the Northern Sea Route will mainly consist in evacuating the energy and mineral resources exploited in the Arctic; see in this respect the LNG (liquefied natural gas) from the Yamal Peninsula and the significant volumes of Russian gas exported by this sea route, notably to European ports⁴.

NATO and “Arctic-minded Nations”

Nevertheless, the reassertion of power in the Arctic is a massive fact. Since 2007, Russian strategic air and sea patrols in the region have resumed, the Northern Fleet has been deployed, and bases have been reopened (see, for example, Kotelny Island, New Siberia, in 2013). At the end of 2015, an Arctic Military Command was established, to which the Northern Fleet is attached. A major effort to reconstitute Russia’s military posture was then announced, a plan maintained despite the drawdowns made necessary by the large-scale war Russia is waging in Ukraine (the “special military operation” of February 24, 2022). The Kremlin’s stated aim is to respect Russian sovereignty over its territory and waters, but claims beyond the Russian EEZ and rivalries with other NATO member states in the area (USA, Canada, Norway, and Denmark), with repercussions in the Nordic-Baltic zone, cannot be ignored.

However, the Western powers engaged or involved in the Arctic have not yet given themselves the means required to strengthen their power and influence there. The United States has just two icebreakers, and Canada has been slow to implement its program to renew its fleet of large vessels of this type, essential to asserting its sovereignty in the Arctic (the program was presented in 2011). The geopolitical stakes are all the more pressing in that China, an ally of Russia and partner in numerous energy projects in the area, intends to develop its presence there, including militarily, in order to protect its interests and strategic investments⁵. These ambitions are already reflected in the organization of Sino-Russian exercises and maneuvers in the Arctic. China’s enduring military presence in an area relatively close to North America wou2ld be a source of problems for the United States and Canada, especially as Beijing’s economic and technological support gives greater weight and credibility to Russia’s regional claims. Nor should the Nordic nations of the European Union and NATO ignore the reality of Sino-Russian threats in the High North.

In the case of Greenland, the American objective does not seem to be territorial conquest, but to prevent the possible independence of this autonomous territory, whose government is being actively courted by Beijing – a hypothetical independence followed by a possible switch to the People’s Republic of China⁶. A few years ago, Washington had to call the attention of the Danish government to thwart Chinese plans to acquire ports and airfields in Greenland. In our view, a clear reaffirmation of Denmark’s sovereignty over this large, mineral-rich and geostrategically valuable Arctic island (see the proximity of the new polar routes and the GIUK Gap) could remove a number of obstacles⁷. This would be done in close collaboration with the United States, which is keen to strengthen its military cooperation in Greenland as well as in the Faroe Islands, another autonomous territory under Danish sovereignty. We know that Washington and Copenhagen are discussing these issues.

In truth, it is in the Nordic-Baltic zone and on the Arctic front that it is important to envisage enhanced military cooperation and “burden sharing”, necessary if US diplomacy and military forces are to be able to reallocate resources to the Indo-Pacific theater, more specifically to the “Asian Mediterranean” (South and East China Seas) and the western Pacific, in the face of Russia’s conquering impulses and China’s thalassocratic ambitions⁸. NATO has the advantage of counting among its members several Arctic-oriented nations, whose armies have specific tactical operational skills. The United States and NATO can thus rely on Canada, Denmark, and Norway, while the recent accession of Finland and Sweden has reinforced the weight and role of the “Arctic-minded” nations. By virtue of its history and connections in the Nordic-Baltic area (remember Hamlet and Elsinore Castle), the United Kingdom, as head of the Joint Expeditionary Force, is a stakeholder in this scheme⁹.

More broadly, all nations involved in the security of the Nordic-Baltic region and the Danish straits (a passageway between the Baltic Sea, the North Sea, and the Arctic), including France, Poland, and Germany, are making their contribution. France is a “polar nation” in terms of diplomacy (observer status on the Arctic Council), naval power, and scientific activities (scientific base on the Norwegian Svalbard archip2elago, shared with Germany). As a member of the European Union and NATO, France necessarily shares the security interests of those countries bordering the Arctic that are members of Euro-Atlantic bodies. In the Arctic, as on the Baltic-Black Sea isthmus, or in the Indo-Pacific region, the rhetoric of “balancing power” and the pose of the “docile soldier” of multilateralism come up against the brutality of facts and defense issues¹⁰.

To conclude 

The truth is that, summit after summit, NATO has for several years been giving increasing prominence to the strategic and geopolitical challenges of the Arctic. This is evidenced by the official declarations agreed by the heads of state and government, as well as the decisions taken and implemented on the ground (infrastructure development, deployment of forces, military maneuvers, and exercises). The region is one of the theaters where “burden sharing” between the United States and its allies is played out in practical, concrete terms, through bilateral and multilateral cooperation agreements. We need to continue in this direction, as Russian and Chinese threats affect a geopolitical theater that is no longer the buffer space of yesteryear (the Cold War, 1947-1991), but one of the geostrategic nodes of the global system.For the United States and its allies alike, it is important to ensure that the slogan “America First” does not become “America Alone”. The resurgence of American exceptionalism, in contrast with the initial fear of a new isolationism, does not automatically imply the end of Western geopolitical solidarity. However, this exceptionalism needs to be part of a broader geopolitical vision: a “Free North Initiative” in the Arctic and the Nordic-Baltic region, the consolidation of a “Jagiellonian Europe” between the Baltic and the Black Sea (with its Ukrainian stronghold), the promotion of the Abraham Agreements and a “New Middle East”, which would strengthen ties with the Indo-Pacific region. In short, a new Western century. “Yes, we can?”

Jean-Sylvestre Mongrenier

Associate professor of history and geography and researcher at the French Institute of Geopolitics (University of Paris VIII). Author of several books, he works within the Thomas More Institute on geopolitical and defense issues in Europe. His research areas cover the Baltic-Black Sea region, post-Soviet Eurasia, and the Mediterranean.

1. The “Northwest Passage” is the shipping line linking the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, from Davis Strait in the west to Behring Strait in the east, across the lands and islands of Canada’s Far North. The term “Northeast Passage” refers to what the Russians call the “Northern Sea Route” (Sevmorpout): the shipping line along the country’s Siberian coast linking the ports of the Barents Sea (Murmansk, Arkhangelsk) to the Behring Sea, and even to the port of Vladivostok on the Sea of Japan. The line thus links the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.
2. The Arctic Council was established by the 1996 Ottawa Declaration, signed by the eight Arctic states (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, United States). It includes non-Arctic states (13 observer states, including France). The Arctic Council’s activities focus on scientific cooperation, environmental protection, the well-being and economic development of indigenous populations, and navigation safety. Since Russia’s “special military operation” against Ukraine, launched on February 24, 2022, the new Cold War between Russia and the West has had an impact on the Arctic Council’s activities.
3. We know that Yemen’s Houthi rebels – supported, armed and informed by the Russian-Iranian duo – are actively sabotaging the Suez route by attacking merchant ships transiting the Red Sea, while sparing those of the People’s Republic of China at the head of this axis of chaos. As for the Panama Canal, Donald Trump’s pressures and threats cannot be understood without reference to China’s actions on this essential passageway between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.
4. Russia supplies Europe with a fifth of the gas it imports, much of it in the form of LNG. Apart from the fact that the monetary counterpart of these volumes finances a Russia that is certainly in a bad way, but which has not yet gone bankrupt, it is easy to understand that there is room for negotiation and compromise with Donald Trump’s trade demands (American producers provide 15% of European gas imports).
5. There is a whole series of Chinese programs and projects grouped together under the name of the “Polar Silk Road”. Beijing has announced plans to build one or more nuclear icebreakers, possibly in cooperation with Russia. Moscow sees this as a sign of the People’s Republic of China’s strong commitment to Russia’s project to revitalize the Northern Sea Route. State-owned Chinese companies have already invested in the development of Russian oil and gas fields in the Arctic zone (see CNPC/ChinaNational Petroleum Corporation and Silk Road Fund ‘s stakes in Yamal LNG). Since Russia’s special military operation against Ukraine (February 24, 2022), i.e. the transition to high-intensity warfare, and the Western sanctions that followed, this Sino-Russian connection has been strengthened.
6. See Jean-Sylvestre Mongrenier, “ États-Unis, Chine, Russie, Le Groenland, nouvelle proie des hyperpuissances mondiales ”, Le Figaro Vox, January 17, 2025.
7. The acronym GIUK refers to a2n imaginary line between Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom. During the Cold War, this line had a highly strategic character, as military surveillance of the “GIUK Gap” made it possible to control the passage of Soviet submarines in the North Atlantic. US and NATO detection and surveillance systems were deployed along this line, between Greenland and Iceland on the one hand, and Iceland and the British archipelago on the other. The new Cold War between Russia and the West, and US President Donald Trump’s obvious interest in Greenland, which he reaffirmed even before the start of his second term (news conference on January 7, 2025), are once again focusing the attention of strategists and geopolitologists on the GIUK Gap and the importance of this mechanism. What is new is the interest of the People’s Republic of China and its navy in the Arctic zone (see the Polar Silk Road), in conjunction with Russia, and, through the GIUK Gap, in access to the North Atlantic.
8. See Ryan R. Duffy et al, “More NATO in the Arctic Could Free the United States Up to Focus on China”, War on The Rocks, November 21, 2024.
9. The British Joint Expeditionary Force is a military force established in 2014 by seven states (the UK, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, and the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania). Finland and Sweden joined the force in 2017, and Iceland in 2021.
10. On “France, polar nation”, see France Diplomatie, Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs.