At the end of the 50-year war (the historical “cold war”, from just after 1945 to the fall of the Berlin Wall), the break-up of the USSR and the disruption of the Nordic balance reduced Russia’s access to the Baltic Sea to two narrow “windows”: St Petersburg, at the head of the Gulf of Finland, and the enclave of Kaliningrad (formerly Königsberg). The entry of Finland and Sweden into the Atlantic Alliance seems to make the Baltic a “NATO lake”. But Russian tactics, known as “hybrid warfare” (sabotage, intimidation, disinformation, and psychological warfare), testify to Moscow’s ambitions in the region. It is up to those most concerned, i.e. the European members of NATO, to deal with it.
Located between the Scandinavian peninsula, Fennoscandia and the German-Polish plain, the Baltic is a semi-enclosed sea with a surface area of 450,000 square kilometers. The Danish straits (the Øresund, the Little Belt, and the Great Belt) control the passage to the North Sea, connecting the Baltic to the North Atlantic. A space of confrontation between the West and Russia, it is wrong to describe the Baltic Sea as the “Northern Mediterranean”. In fact, French geographer Yves Lacoste refers to maritime areas of around 4000 km in length as “Mediterraneans”, following the example of the Mediterranean Sea, the Gulf of Mexico-Caribbean Sea area (the “American Mediterranean”), and the China Sea (the “Asian Mediterranean”). The Baltic Sea is smaller: it extends over 1500 km, and its surface area is six times smaller than that of the Mediterranean Sea. Above all, the expression “Northern Mediterranean” functions as a metaphor for peace and prosperity, which has little to do with the situation in the Baltic Sea and the geopolitical prospects of the region, already at war in a way.
Gone are the “Nordic balances”
During the 50-year war, the Baltic Sea was governed by the “Nordic balances”: it was shared between the USSR and its satellites (Poland, the former German Democratic Republic), neighboring NATO members (the former Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark) and the neutral states (Sweden, Finland). NATO controlled the Danish straits and, facing the Soviet Baltic fleet, attached to Kaliningrad (formerly Königsberg), ensured a fairly strong naval presence. Since then, the break-up of the USSR has completely changed the regional geopolitical configuration. Russia now only has two narrow windows on the Baltic Sea: St Petersburg and the enclave of Kaliningrad, between Lithuania and Poland. Most of the countries bordering the sea, including the independent Baltic states, have joined the European Union and NATO1. The Baltic seems to be becoming a European sea once again. To develop cooperation between the Baltic coastal states, a Council of the Baltic Sea States was established (1992), which includes Russia. Although not a coastal state, Norway is a member, and the European Commission is represented (the United States and several non-coastal European countries have observer status). Some of the Baltic coastal states also participate in more or less broad cooperation structures: the Nordic Council, the Barents Euro-Arctic Council and the Arctic Council.
Despite this network of organizations, the extension of regional cooperation to Russia has failed; energy issues, ecological questions and geopolitical disputes reverberate on each other. Above all, Russian revisionist policy is worrying the countries in the region, which are seeking the security guarantees provided by NATO and, to a lesser extent, by the European Union. In addition to the provocations at the maritime and air borders of the states in the region, the Putinist theme of defending the “Russian world” raises the geopolitical issue of the Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia and Latvia.
The Russian war against Ukraine, which broke out in February 2014, has also had repercussions in the Nordic-Baltic region. In the Baltic states, as in Poland, there are fears of Putin’s policy of fait accompli: seizing a territorial pledge and testing the solidity of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. In order to preventively prohibit such an action, NATO and its members decided, at the Newport summit (September 4-5, 2014), to consolidate their deterrence and defense posture on the Baltic-Black Sea isthmus through “reassurance measures”. Subsequently, the Warsaw summit (July 8-9, 2016) strengthened NATO’s “forward presence” in the region.
For its part, Moscow intends to make Kaliningrad a “fortress” and the Russian armed forces are increasing their Anti Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities, by means of anti-aircraft and anti-missile systems, fighter-bombers and anti-ship missiles. The aim is to form an air and sea “strategic bubble” that would deny NATO forces access to the Baltic, ensuring that Russia has control over the communication channels. In this way, the Baltic would become a “Russian sea2”. In such a locked down space, the strategic situation of the Baltic states would be compromised. Consequently, Western experts are examining various scenarios, including the possibility of a Russian assault on the “Suwałki Gap”, a strip of Polish-Lithuanian territory linking Belarus to Kaliningrad: the Baltic states would then be cut off from their allies, with the A2/AD system keeping the latter’s reinforcements at bay.
The enlargement of NATO and its missions
On February 24, 2022, the new Russian aggression against Ukraine caused a historic turn in the Nordic-Baltic region. On May 18, 2022, Finland and Sweden renounced their “non-allied” status and, not giving in to Russian threats, applied for NATO membership3. Although Turkey and Hungary put up a temporary obstacle, both countries joined NATO (2024). Since then, all the Nordic-Baltic countries have belonged to the same political-military alliance, which upsets the regional balance of power4. More than ever, the region of St Petersburg (with the ports of Vyborg and Ust-Luga), at the end of the Gulf of Finland, is comparable to a “window” on the Baltic, to which must be added the enclave of Kaliningrad. As for the Baltic states, Sweden and Finland give them a new strategic depth. In this regard, it is worth noting the strategic importance of the port of Gothenburg for supporting the Baltic states and Finland, those of the island of Gotland in the center of the Baltic, and of the island of Bornholm for the protection of the Danish straits.
In short, the Allies, if they give themselves the means, could become the masters of the Baltic5. All the more so as Russia is preoccupied with the war in Ukraine: the Russian armed forces had to permanently strip the Kaliningrad “fortress” in order to redeploy the most combat-ready units to the Ukrainian theater. Similarly, the Russian Baltic fleet was weakened by the transfer of units to the Black Sea in the weeks preceding the launch of the “special operation”. And this at a time when Finland and Sweden are real military-industrial players whose positions and capabilities are contributing to the upheaval of the balance of power in the Nordic-Baltic region. As things stand, it is difficult to imagine that Russia could restore its military superiority in the Baltic theater, or even rebalance the relationship of forces with NATO: the military integration of Belarus into the Russian military apparatus will not be enough. It is therefore up to the Russian nuclear arsenal to compensate for the conventional imbalance.
In fact, Germany’s establishment of a multinational command dedicated to the Baltic, based in Rostock, and the launch in early 2025 of the allied mission Baltic Sentry, are a step in the right direction6. However, it would be premature to bank on Russia’s resignation and to think that Moscow’s announcements regarding the nuclearization of Kaliningrad and Belarus are just a cover-up. In fact, Russia is conducting a form of covert warfare (a “hybrid war”) in the region against the countries bordering the Baltic, all of which are now designated as enemies. This ranges from cyberattacks and the targeting of critical (energy and logistical) infrastructure to the jamming of the GPS radio navigation signal used by civil aviation, risking a serious air accident.
As a recent report indicates, Russian services are “mapping the weak points and fault lines of the target countries7”. And there is no shortage of vulnerable sites in a sea that has many gas pipelines, wind farms, and cable networks. Less commented on than the destruction of the Nord Stream gas pipeline a year earlier, the damage to the Balticconnector (a gas pipeline connecting Finland and Estonia) and to a telecommunications cable in October 2023 illustrates the level of threats in the Baltic Sea. Since then, other acts of this type have occurred (two cables ruptured in November 2024, a third in December), which has led NATO’s regional allies to react (see the Baltic Sentry mission above). Each time, the suspected vessel has come from the Russian port of Vostochny, near St Petersburg, and very often, the involvement of the People’s Republic of China also appears.
It is important to look beyond these “skirmishes” and other misdeeds linked to the movements of the oil tankers of the Russian “ghost fleet8” (the smuggling of Russian oil driven from international markets by Western sanctions). It is worth noting that Moscow has increased the resources allocated to the Main Deep-Sea Research Directorate (GUGI), whose activities are kept secret, with all that this implies in the region: the mapping then the systematic targeting of so-called “critical” infrastructure in the event of open warfare9. In anticipation of this, Sweden has also shelved a number of civilian projects in the Baltic (wind farms and other projects) because they are too exposed or would hamper the responsiveness of its armed forces and its war fleet. The issues at stake in the Baltic will also have to be linked to those in the Arctic10.
To conclude
Finally, the geopolitical discourse of the Russian government and the claims in the Nordic-Baltic region prevent us from seeing this “hybrid war” as a kind of second-best solution whose real objective would be to save face. This is evidenced by the covetousness over part of Finnish and Estonian territorial waters, glimpsed during the unexpected publication of a text by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition to the desire to expand Russia’s “windows” on the Baltic and, through provocations, to test the cohesion of NATO members, Vladimir Putin intends to reaffirm his Greater Russian and Eurasian project in which the Baltic is just an adjacent sea, necessarily dominated in the long term (see the reference to Peter the Great).
Believing that time is on his side, perhaps wrongly, his lordship in the Kremlin is taking a long-term view. It is up to those most directly concerned, i.e. the Nordic-Baltic members of NATO and their West European allies, to face up to this, with their own resources, due to the uncertainties of American leadership. This is also how a European pillar will be built in the Atlantic Alliance. From the Baltic to the Black Sea, with Ukraine as an advanced geostrategic “bastion”, the capacity of European allies to face up to and hold the “barrier of the East” (French historian and journalist Jacques Bainville) will determine the borders of a future Pan-Europe, heir to the Old West and the general spirit of its civilization.
Please note: an initial version of this text was published in an issue of Grands Dossiers de Diplomatie (ed. Thomas Delage), published on the occasion of the Euronaval 2024 trade show.
Associate professor of history and geography and researcher at the French Institute of Geopolitics (University of Paris VIII). Author of several books, he works within the Thomas More Institute on geopolitical and defense issues in Europe. His research areas cover the Baltic-Black Sea region, post-Soviet Eurasia, and the Mediterranean.
Footnotes
- Sweden and Finland joined the European Union in 1995 but remain outside NATO. However, they joined the Partnership for Peace program in 1994.
- However, the modernization of the Baltic fleet is far behind that of the other five Russian fleets.
- In retaliation, Gazprom stopped its natural gas deliveries to Finland (May 21, 2022), one week after stopping electricity exports to the country. In addition, the Russian defense ministry has announced that Russia will open twelve new bases in the Western Military District. The fact remains that Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO is part of a deep-rooted logic. Since the signing of the Partnership for Peace (1994), military cooperation has made it possible to develop interoperability with the Allies. The two countries also participate in Nordic military cooperation, a structure of which the other three parties (Denmark, Norway, and Iceland) are NATO members. In 2017, Finland and Sweden joined the Joint Expeditionary Force, set up by the UK with nine Baltic and Nordic countries
- See Jean-Sylvestre Mongrenier, “La Baltique sera-t-elle le centre de gravité de l’Europe ?”, Desk Russie, November 11, 2023
- In short, the Baltic would be a “western sea”. While the Germans, Danes, Swedes, and Finns refer to the Baltic as the “East Sea” (Ostsee in German), it should be noted that the Estonians call it the “West Sea”.
- Out of (outdated) respect for the NATO-Russia agreements signed in 1997, which exclude the reinforcement of NATO on the territory of the former GDR, the Rostock command does not report directly to the integrated military structure; it is a German command open to Berlin’s allies and partners. Furthermore, the Secretary General of NATO announced the launch of the Baltic Sentry mission at a meeting of Nordic-Baltic leaders in Helsinki on January 14, 2025. For more information on this “new activity,” see the NATO website.
- This is the report “Hunting Down Russia’s Hybrid War”, published on May 27, 2024 by experts from the Nordic-Baltic countries.
- See Julien Bouissou, Francesca Fattori, Riccardo Pravettoni, “The Phantom Fleet: Investigating the New Routes for Russian Oil”, Le Monde, August 6, 2023.
- The GUGI reports to the GRU (Russian military intelligence). It has a fleet of ships capable of operating in deep water and underwater drones.
- Jean-Sylvestre Mongrenier, “Confronting the Moscow-Beijing Axis: The Need for a Common Western Front in the Arctic”, Desk Russie, January 27, 2025
