I was mistaken in my editorial of March 1st when I claimed that the war in Ukraine would prevent Russia from actively supporting Iran, since it was becoming bogged down there. In fact, Russia is providing military aid to its ally, notably through satellite surveillance and advanced missile guidance technologies, and this aid is having a significant impact. Apparently, Putin is not afraid to divert resources from the Ukrainian theater and undermine Trump’s pro-Russian stance on the war in Ukraine.
This is because the new Gulf War is a phase in the global war launched by Russia in February 2022 for the “de-Westernization of the world.1” Global as of February 24, 2022, because the aggression against Ukraine threatens the entire European continent, and because Russia is allied with China, Iran, and North Korea. This is why the new Gulf War, whether Trump is aware of it or not, has a global dimension.
It is against this backdrop that Europeans need to assess their positions and actions.
If the conflict in the Persian Gulf were merely a regional one, Europeans would undoubtedly be right to stay out of a campaign launched without them and with uncertain prospects. But this is an episode of the global war that began in Ukraine. It is even a decisive episode, given the multitude of protagonists and the global reach of the conflict’s economic and geopolitical consequences. For the United States, what is at stake is nothing less than the loss or preservation of its position as the dominant power in the 21st Century—that is, the defeat of the West that Putin dreams of. Europeans are therefore caught in a dilemma: this war is unfortunate, but the consequences of a defeat for the Israeli-American coalition would affect them to such an extent that they must do everything possible to avoid such a catastrophe.
This analysis may seem too simple and too blunt, but I believe there is no escaping it. First, the scenario of a negotiated compromise to resolve the crisis is just as unlikely as it is between Russia and Ukraine. The plan for a coalition of volunteers to guarantee freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz after the end of hostilities is just as laughable as the coalition supposedly intended to guarantee Ukraine’s security after a ceasefire: there will be no ceasefire in Ukraine because Russia intends to wage war to the bitter end, and the Strait of Hormuz will not be opened because control of it is the Iranian regime’s lifeline and a tool for tormenting the global economy. Bolstered by its resilience despite massive bombardments, Iran is capitalizing on its advantage as the weaker party: if it does not lose the war, it will be a victory—and thus a defeat for the United States. Consequently, it is unrealistic to hope to negotiate the opening of the Strait while refraining from weakening or overthrowing the Iranian regime. Second, the economic consequences of continuing the war—or even just the war over the straits2—will be devastating for Europe, for Africa, and even for the United States, but not for China or Russia.
It is believed that Trump is seeking a way out to end hostilities without losing face, and that the same is true of the Iranian regime. But this is wishful thinking: the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) care little for the damage inflicted on their economy or the suffering of their people as long as they have enough ammunition to continue the war, for their goal is a global Islamic revolution, even at the cost of Persia. Moreover, the fanaticism factor would not be as perilous for the United States if Iran were not actively supported by Russia and China. With very different styles and paces, the two nations share the same goal: to weaken America. Already, they are capitalizing on the oil crisis, which is bailing out a Russian budget on the brink of collapse and barely affecting China. China, in fact, has massive strategic reserves of crude oil—1.4 billion barrels, more than the United States (413 million) and even more than all developed countries combined, including the Gulf monarchies—and it has the means to diversify its supply sources. Unlike Europe, China can weather a global recession that will certainly affect the volume of its exports but not its supremacy in strategic sectors such as the automotive industry and AI.
Finally, the United States’ commitment to the Gulf dangerously reduces its capacity for action in the Asia-Pacific, especially since it has depleted a very significant portion of its stockpiles of weapons and ammunition and remains trapped in a military model based on extremely costly equipment, which is therefore impossible to replace quickly. Yet the very nature of real wars is that their duration is unpredictable and one must be prepared for them. Tiny Ukraine was able to devise, under the barrage of Russian bombardments, an unprecedented model based on new technologies and the mass production of inexpensive ammunition and weapons, particularly drones. The United States is far from having adapted.
Faced with a disaster waiting to happen, one might ask with schadenfreude: “What were they doing getting themselves into this mess? ” One might, but one cannot. Certainly, Europeans have good reasons not to like the United States and even more so what it has become: selfishness disguised as Wilsonian humanism, the lack of regard for allies—which has gone from casual disregard to outright betrayal under Donald Trump— the crass and self-satisfied vulgarity of the MAGA crowd, the privilege of the dollar, the blunders and mistakes the United States has strung together since it “won” the Cold War. But let’s imagine for a moment what would become of the world—and Europe in particular—if the United States were no longer the world’s leading power.
Yet this is precisely what is at stake in this necessary and unfortunate war. Necessary because Iran is a growing threat as the mullahs’ regime approaches the nuclear threshold—or even seeks to cross it: an existential threat to Israel, but one that also holds the entire region hostage, tormented by the heavily armed militias deployed by Iran, euphemistically referred to as “proxies.” And even more necessary since Iran has become an ally of Russia and China in their project to “de-Westernize the world.” But unfortunate because the United States once again fell for the mirage of “overwhelming force” in an asymmetric war, just like Israel, which was nevertheless supposed to know and closely monitor the regime and its military capabilities; unfortunate because the United States failed to avoid the trap of the Strait of Hormuz, with its cascading consequences for freedom of navigation in other strategic straits and channels vital to global trade.
The caution of European governments is understandable; they must find the path as narrow and dangerous as the Strait of Hormuz. But caution is not enough. We must defend the West as a reality and as a destiny. European leaders should show courage and responsibility toward their people, instead of speaking to them only about fuel prices. Meanwhile, Ukraine is fighting for its freedom and ours.
Lecturer at the University of Paris II Panthéon-Assas. Teaches philosophy and political science.