‘Reflexive control’ is a technique whereby one side deliberately shapes the information and motivations available to an opponent, so that the opponent makes decisions that harm their own interests. A skilled actor can nudge their enemy toward choices that look rational from their perspective, but are strategically wrong. A classic illustration appears in Uncle Remus Tales where Brother Rabbit, at some critical point, tricks Brother Fox by asking: “Whatever you do don’t throw me into the briar patch”.
Faking the narratives
The Kremlin’s recent canard about Ukraine’s assassination attempt on President Putin might be another example of such manipulation. The story did not look plausible in its core and was apparently not designed to look that way. Ukrainians may have many reasons to assassinate the commander-in-chief of the enemies’ army – an accused war criminal, who butchers Ukrainian civilians with drones and missiles. But they would have certainly not employed the slow-moving drones against a tightly protected person, extremely cautious if not paranoid about his own security. There was no evidence of the alleged Ukrainian attack on Putin’s residence – either from satellites of from local residents. Russians did not even bother to stage a more plausible false-flag attack on Putin’s residence by launching their own missile presumably from Ukraine. The story was fabricated not so much to persuade but to confuse and detract.
Perhaps not incidentally the story was invented by the time of Putin’s planned conversation with Donald Trump, so that the U.S. president could learn about Ukrainian perfidy from the horse’s mouth. And Trump almost swallowed that hook but, luckily, was eventually informed by the CIA chief and other professionals that the story was fake. The Americans were not fooled but the lie made nonetheless inroads in many countries, like India, Pakistan, the Emirates or in Central Asia, where leaders rushed to express their deep concern with Ukraine’s alleged terrorism. (Remarkably, the same governments have not bothered much about Russian daily terrorism against Ukrainian civilians). The primary goal of the operation was not achieved since Donald Trump did not buy the fabrication this time and did not terminate the talks with Zelensky on a reasonable and acceptable peace plan. But its cumulative effect was still positive since it worked pretty well in the Global South – the major importer of Russian lies, and, of course, domestically in Russia itself. Even in the West, where the story was quickly disproved, it was still beneficial for Moscow since it got all the media to discuss the fiction while detracting attention, for a few days at least, from the real war crimes and state-run Russian terrorism.
In these terms, the Kremlin’s previous exercise in reflexive control was much more successful. In November, they not only laundered the so-called ‘28-point peace plan’ via Washington but also made all the media, throngs of experts, and diplomats to discuss the dubious document that Moscow, in fact, never approved or submitted officially. The plan was leaked to the media as delivered allegedly to both Kyiv and Moscow on Trump’s behalf by his special envoy and long-time business partner Steve Witkoff. Remarkably, the Moscow origins of the plan – “Russian fingerprints all over it” – were quite visible from the very beginning. Even Marco Rubio called it “unacceptable” (though he eventually backpedaled from his initial criticism). “This is not a plan for peace,” Christian Cary summed up in his close analysis of the document. “It is a plan for Russian victory and Ukrainian capitulation. The spirit of 1938 has been resurrected.”
The ‘spirit of 1938’ is a reference to the notorious Munich agreement signed by the UK, France, and Italy with Nazi Germany that forced Czechoslovakia to cede parts of its territory to Hitler, paving the way to further dismantling and occupation of the country and, eventually, the whole of Europe. ‘Munich’ has since been a popular metaphor of political cynicism and betrayal, being broadly employed nowadays by various commentators to describe Trump’s ‘peacemaking’ policy vis-a-vis Ukraine. Thomas Friedman of the New York Times suggested, tongue in cheek, that the U.S. president should be distinguished with the ‘Neville Chamberlain Peace Prize’ instead of the Nobel Peace Prize he covets so much. (British prime minister Chamberlain is referred to here as the main architect of the ‘Munich deal’). If Trump’s plan is forced on Ukraine as it is, Friedman maintains, “we will need to add a new verb to the diplomatic lexicon: ‘Trumped’ — to be sold out by an American president, for reasons none of his citizens understand (but surely there are reasons).”
Leaked conversations
However ignominious per se, the story became even more scandalous a few days later, after Bloomberg revealed the eavesdropping conversations between Witkoff and Putin’s aide Yuri Ushakov, and between Ushakov and another of Putin’s negotiators, Kirill Dmitriev, the CEO of Russian Direct Investment Fund. Records firmly confirmed the Moscow origins of the ‘plan’, quite discernable even before not only in terms of content but also in language – poorly run from Russian through an automatic translator.
In one conversation, Dmitriev and Ushakov conspire to manipulate an apparently ignorant and submissively pro-Russian Witkoff, inciting him to submit the Kremlin-baked ‘plan’ to Trump and present it as his own. “I think we’ll just make this paper from our position,” Dmitriev says, “and I’ll informally pass it along, making it clear that it’s all informal. And let them do like their own. I don’t think they’ll take exactly our version, but at least it’ll be as close to it as possible.” In response, Ushakov agrees that the Americans might not be so gullible; they could make some changes in the document and then claim that they were agreed with Moscow. “Well, that’s exactly the point,” Ushakov says. “That’s what I’m afraid of… They might twist it later, that’s all. There is that risk.” Dmitriev, however, is more confident and assures Ushakov that he would ask Witkoff to keep the wording “word for word” and that everything would be done “neatly”.
The earlier conversation between Ushakov and Witkoff is even more revealing – and abhorrent. Here, Trump’s “envoy” (with no diplomatic experience or regional expertise) apparently plays on the Kremlin side, teaching his Russian interlocutors how to better manipulate his boss: just congratulate Mr. Trump, he says, on achieving the Gaza peace deal (reached shortly before that conversation) and praise him lavishly as a man of peace, – i.e. massage his hubris and ego as much as possible.
In most governments, such revelations would have resulted in immediate firing of such “envoys” but not in Trump’s. When asked about the scandal, he habitually attacked the journalists who allegedly undermine his peace efforts and then he declared that there was nothing unusual in Witkoff’s actions, it was arguably a ‘normal’ approach to negotiations: “That’s a standard thing, you know, because he has got to sell this to Ukraine. He’s got to sell Ukraine to Russia. That’s what a dealmaker does.” The slip of the tongue looks very Freudian here: Witkoff, in Trump’s reasoning, is selling to Ukraine something called “this” (a bogus “peace plan”), while at the same time he is selling to Russia something much more substantial – “Ukraine”. And Witkoff himself strictly follows this logic. In the leaked conversation with Ushakov, he says: “Now, from me to you, I know what it’s going to take to get a peace deal done: Donetsk and maybe a land swap somewhere.” Ukraine, indeed, is little more here than a “real estate chip being traded over cigars at Mar-a-Lago.”
The Kremlin’s win-win game
Long before the Moscow shenanigans became obvious, the most perspicacious experts aptly assessed the ‘plan’ as another Moscow trick, a smokescreen, aimed at detracting attention from the genocidal war in Ukraine, from daily destructions and killings, to imitate some ‘peace process’ and readiness for a ‘negotiated solution’, “to soften Washington’s position by demonstrating that Russia ‘has something to give in financial terms’ to the United States and people in President Donald Trump’s circle,” to avoid any new sanctions prepared by the U.S. Congress, to prove the ‘peace loving’ nature of the essentially terrorist state, and put the ball, i.e. the blame and responsibility for the continued war, on Ukraine’s side.
And since the ‘plan’ officially came not from Moscow but, presumably, from Washington, Moscow had no commitments vis-a-vis that plan: it contains some very good positions, they said, that could be used as a base for further negotiations. Which means that even if Kyiv and Washington fully accept the ‘plan’, Moscow would still be ‘improving’ the text until it fully accommodates the Kremlin’s imperialistic whims. The ensuing statements of Russian officials leave little doubt on the scope and direction of the desired ‘improvements’: “the goals of our ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine have not changed.” In other words (if you go beyond Putin’s euphemisms and read carefully his trusted ideologues), Ukraine should be erased from earth as both a sovereign state and a distinct nation under the sham slogans of its ‘demilitarization’, ‘denazification’, and ‘reeducation’ of Ukrainians ‘back’ into Russians.
The Kremlin’s fraudulent ‘plan’ laundered via useful idiots is a perfect example of reflexive control: the international media, experts and politicians rushed to discuss document which even its authors did not take seriously (hence so many obscurities, incoherencies and absurdities in the text). Luckily, not all of them bought the fake at face value. The day after the ‘plan’ was published, James Sherr of Chatham House opined sarcastically that Moscow confirmed once again its “talents at ‘painting a picture’ that induces us to ‘initiate’ the very steps that Russia wants us to take.” Julia Struck of the Kyiv Post also discerned a familiar pattern: “a Russia-origin proposal is laundered through Western media and figures close to Trump, including Witkoff, who has appeared in previous failed ‘peace framework’ attempts.” Finally, Edward Lucas summarized this criticism perfectly: “Badly drafted, one-sided, and machine-translated from Russian, the supposed 28-point peace plan should have been a laughing stock. Instead, it prompted anguish in Ukraine, panic in Europe, and frantic backpedaling by the bits of the U.S. administration that understand maps, words, and diplomacy. All that was a fine result for Russia. A clever leak highlighted and aggravated our divisions and weaknesses.”
It is really appalling that so many experts and politicians still fail to understand the obvious: that Moscow is not interested in any negotiations and compromises insofar as its ultimate goal is the final solution of the Ukrainian question: Ukraine’s destruction and subjugation. Russians’ interest in the ‘peace process’ is very peculiar: they support it only to a degree to which it brings them closer to the sacred initial goal of the ‘special military operation’. If the process results in Ukraine’s ‘peaceful’ capitulation under Trump’s heavy pressure, it would be perfect though very unlikely. But if that sham process merely gives them more time, and cover, and capacity to achieve their primary goal by military means, it would also be fine and worth the spurious ‘peacemaking’ efforts.
Ukraine’s prospects
Ukrainians have very limited room for maneuver in this situation. They have learnt, since February, that it would be futile to appeal to the notions of justice, morality, solidarity or international law just because these categories do not exist in Trump’s universe. They learnt, with Europeans’ help, that if somebody believes he is a Napoleon, it would be better not to dissuade him from that belief but, rather, persuade him to go together against Wellington, or Kutuzov, or Alexander I. They learnt to say “yes, Sir” hiding their true agenda in a humble “but” after the brave “yes”. They did not call Witkoff-Dmitriev plan the bulls*** that it was, but thanked Mr. Trump once again (and keep on thanking him recurrently) for his peace efforts, while completely reworking, with Europeans, that “plan” into something more feasible – predictably rejected by the Russians without any discussion.
As protracted negotiations between Trump’s and Zelensky’s representatives in Miami about a new plan brought no breakthrough, and the visit of Trump’s envoys to Moscow ended up with their spectacular humiliation in the Kremlin (though still stubbornly not recognized by Trump who prefers to put all the blame on Zelensky), the peace talks have apparently reached the point where all the parties raise the stakes with the hope that their rival will blink first. Ukraine has been cheated by Russia and betrayed by the allies so often throughout its history that it can hardly accept any deal without ironclad security guarantees. And it cannot cede to Russia the territories it failed to occupy in four years of brutal war. Russia cannot accept anything less than Ukraine’s defeat and subordination. And Trump cannot accept anything that may hinder his envisioned business with Moscow in case he puts real pressure on the Kremlin, but he is also reluctant to undermine his peacemaking image and Nobel Prize prospects if he blatantly sacrifices Ukraine. This is where all the ambiguity of the ‘peace process’ comes from, beneficial, so far, for Moscow but increasingly harmful for Ukraine.
Kyiv still has some cards, even though very few and not very strong: Ukrainian society – exhausted, bleeding, but still resilient; Europeans – divided and preoccupied with domestic issues but still committed to what they call European values and support for Ukraine; the American people and the U.S. Congress, increasingly critical of President Trump and rather favorable toward Ukraine while unfavorable toward Russia; and, ironically, Mr. Trump himself or, more precisely, his vanity and bizarre obsession with the Nobel Peace Prize – unachievable, definitely, if he throws Ukraine under the Russian bus. But still the business interests of President Trump and his partners seem to prevail, putting Ukraine in a precarious situation and making its president to hectically seek help in European capitals.
Sadly enough, only America has a full set of cards to bring to a close the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war. They may either deliver a full victory to Russia (Moscow’s first-best option), or help Ukraine to reestablish its territorial integrity within internationally recognized borders (Ukraine’s first-best option), or freeze the conflict at current frontlines and enforce the ceasefire for years to come. The first option is the easiest since it does not require much effort or any resources, – suffice just to abandon Ukraine, stop any assistance, and lift all the sanctions from Russia. But this may have very serious political repercussions for Trump himself, for his party, and for America in general. The second option is the most difficult since it requires very strong military assistance for Ukraine, hardly available and affordable insofar as Ukraine does not belong to the sphere of vital interests of the U.S. The third option looks the most feasible and realistic. It may require more military assistance but the main instruments here are economic sanctions, including secondary sanctions, and their tough and coordinated enforcement. The main problem here is cognitive: the incumbent American leadership needs to recognize something quite obvious for most Ukrainians and many Europeans – that Russia will not stop until and unless it is stopped – by force, not by any ‘negotiations’.
So far, Russia is spectacularly successful in exercising reflexive control over the U.S. president, exploiting his three major vulnerabilities: greed (corruption), vanity (narcissism), and ignorance. It seems Ukrainians and Europeans try to develop their own methods of reflexive control but they are much more constrained, both morally and politically. The uncomfortable reality they encounter these days is that they still need the U.S. as an ally but can neither trust them nor endorse their cynical views and arrogant policies. Their vague response to Trump’s latest adventure in Venezuela and repeated threats to Greenland largely reflect this ambiguity. Robert Shrimsley of the Financial Times dubs it sardonically “strategic supplication.” “Until western Europe seriously commits to its own defense,” he avers, “its only tactic is to try to retain a voice at the American Caesar’s court. For now, calculated abasement is the only foreseeable policy.” This is hardly a match for the Kremlin’s proactive and elaborate policies in the same court.
An earlier, shorter English version of this text was published by Raam.
Mykola Ryabchuk is a research director at the Institute of Political and Nationality Studies of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and a lecturer at the George Washington University. He has written extensively on civil society, nation-state building, national identity, and post-communist transition. One of his books has been translated into French: De la 'Petite-Russie' à l'Ukraine, published in Paris by L'Harmattan in 2003.