On the United States’ National Security Strategy

The publication of a National Security Strategy (2025 NSS) by the U.S. administration is a legal obligation that involves a heavy bureaucratic exercise and the establishment of compromises between the various U.S. departments and agencies. It is an important document that provides insight into the worldview of the leadership team and its strategic priorities. The author questions the attitude of Europeans and the responses to the U.S. strategy.

The National Security Strategy of the second Trump administration, presented on December 4, signals a break withprevious documents published during the Cold War and in the three decades that followed. Let us skip over the 27 references to Donald Trump by name in 29 pages, which seem to place him above the United States; this is unprecedented and speaks volumes about the decline of public spirit. Notwithstanding the constant reminder that the United States is a superpower, the 2025 NSS confirms the Trump administration’s willingness to relinquish its role as guardian of the international system and hegemonic stabilizer. The world can go to hell, the Trump administration’s ideologues, as unacknowledged disciples of Ayn Rand, do not care: Atlas shrugged [Editor’s note: Ayn Rand’s most influential novel]. Despite repeated assertions about America’s unrivaled strength, they seem to have embraced the illusion of the “great retreat” and “Fortress America” that prevailed between the two world wars¹, an illusion that evaporated with the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.

While the NSS published in 2017, during Donald Trump’s first term, described Russia and China as revisionist powers that were undermining international stability, the former now appears to be only a European problem, while the latter seems to be more of a geo-economic rival than a strategic threat: so farewell to the great Indo-Pacific theater on which a new and expanded version of containment had to be practiced? It is true that there are numerous references to European allies, but they are considered client states with which relations would be strictly bilateral, monetized, and reversible at any time². Strategically speaking, Europe’s importance comes after that of the “Western Hemisphere” (a pompous addition of a “Trump corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine³) and the Asia-Pacific region, and even that of the Middle East!

This is still to rebuke Europe, using as an argument the historical and civilizational ties between the two shores of the North Atlantic. The European continent, it is written, will be “unrecognizable in twenty years or less” if current trends continue. “[Its] economic decline is overshadowed by the real and more abrupt prospect of civilizational obliteration.” The symptoms highlighted by the 2025 NSS are as follows: falling birth rates, immigration and the loss of national identities, repression of political opposition, censorship of freedom of expression, and “regulatory suffocation,” which explains Europe’s declining share of global wealth production. “Over the long term, it is more than plausible that within a few decades at the latest, certain NATO members will become majority non-European,” the document states. In short, Europe is portrayed as “Wokistan” and an appendage of the U.S. Democratic Party, which Donald Trump considers an “enemy of the people⁴.”

In response to Europe’s ills, the 2025 NSS advocates a kind of ideological annexation, while explaining that the United States no longer wants to commit to defending the Old Continent (the United States is positioned as a third party and “honest broker” between Russia and NATO, as if it no longer belonged to the latter). In many ways, the 2025 NSS resembles a MAGA (Make America Great Again) manifesto, with no real content in terms of strategic and geopolitical expertise, which confirms rather than reveals the imago of the Trumpist base. Nevertheless, it is significant and gives cause for concern. Russians, Chinese, Iranians, and North Koreans are encouraged in their geopolitical ambitions and may even be pressured to act before the “window of opportunity” closes. History shows that Americans are fickle and can go to war after giving the impression for some time that they were completely indifferent to the fate of the outside world ruled by tyrants and despots, hence the need to press ahead.

While there is no point in getting indignant and arguing, the attitude of European powers must be firm, first and foremost with regard to Ukraine, the Old Continent’s first line of defense against Russia-Eurasia. Four years after Putin’s ultimatum to the West and the launch of his “special military operation,” Putin has given up nothing in Ukraine or throughout Europe, which he views through the prism of Eurasian ideology, namely a small corner of Asia to be dominated by a combination of direct and indirect methods. To avoid being marginalized by the Trump-Putin duo, a “coalition of the willing” has been formed. Founded on the initiative of Czech President Petr Pavel on March 1, 2025, it brings together 35 countries opposed to Russian military aggression, which want to compensate for the risk of American disengagement⁵.

On April 10, 2025, the coalition of the willing was officially formed at NATO headquarters in Brussels. On this occasion, the creation of a “Reassurance Force” was proposed with the aim of maintaining peace in Ukraine in the event of a ceasefire. In concrete terms, the coalition of volunteers aims to facilitate peace negotiations between Ukraine and Russia and to obtain solid security guarantees to deter further Russian aggression after a hypothetical ceasefire⁶. This plan, which is still theoretical, needs to be rethought in light of the Trump administration’s abandonment of Kyiv and the need to preserve Ukrainian independence, beyond mere financial, economic, and military-industrial support (arms deliveries and cooperation between arms manufacturers). If this were not the case, the “volunteers” would prove to be indecisive and inconsistent.

More generally, the urgency of the situation requires that a response to American disinvestment in Europe be prepared as quickly as possible. It would be risky to think that a weakening or eclipse of NATO could be compensated for by a “Europe of defense,” i.e., the European Union’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). In fact, the defense of Europe—from the Atlantic to the Don River basin and from the Arctic to the eastern Mediterranean—exceeds the political, institutional, and geographical boundaries of the European Union. For this reason, the United Kingdom, Norway, Iceland, and Turkey, on the south-eastern flank and in the Black Sea basin, must be involved in the defense of Europe. However, these countries are members of NATO but not of the European Union. The latter has a key role to play in mobilizing the necessary funding for European rearmament, supporting the modernization of essential infrastructure, and promoting the emergence of a European arms market, but the organization of Europe’s defense and the coordination of national efforts requires a broader geostrategic framework.

The overall challenge lies in the Europeanization of NATO, whose headquarters, standards, interoperability, and expertise are valuable geostrategic assets⁷. Such an undertaking would require major transatlantic negotiations, which must be attempted. The United States would provide the resources lacking in European NATO member states, which would compensate for the withdrawal of American forces and equipment currently deployed on European soil, particularly on NATO’s eastern front. They would also need to staff more command posts in NATO’s military structure, with the eventual appointment of a European general officer as SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe). Ultimately, European allies should acquire the means to increase their capacity for collective action, which would rebalance relations between the two sides of the North Atlantic⁸.

Finally, we have seen that the defense of Europe exceeds the political and institutional capabilities of the European Union: in addition to Ukraine, its first line of defense, it requires countries outside the EU, such as the United Kingdom, Norway, and Turkey. Furthermore, the modular organization of this defense and the multiple enhanced regional cooperations (see above) pose the challenge of unity and coherence for the whole. The situation requires a kind of informal directorate: a G-4 (or E-4) bringing together Paris, London, Berlin, and Warsaw, or even a G-5 (the same plus Rome), which would provide impetus, facilitate decision-making within the European Union and a Europeanized NATO, and act as an interface with Washington on diplomatic, strategic, and military issues. This function would be crucial: the United States, which no longer wants to be a “European power” but a “power in Europe,” is likely to behave as a “spoiler,” breaking with its historical role as a “hegemonic stabilizer.” If this grouping of powers were to succeed in establishing a symmachia, i.e., a permanent and stable political-military alliance, it could evolve into a pan-European Security Council whose makeup would change depending on strategic issues and geopolitical areas (with provisional members in addition to permanent members).

Finally, the possibility of a U.S. withdrawal makes it necessary to address the issue of extended nuclear deterrence, which has always been provided by the United States⁹. In truth, Donald Trump’s indecision and his proclaimed contempt for Europe and NATO have undermined the credibility on which the nuclear option is based. In this context, France and the United Kingdom should therefore ensure a strategy of extended nuclear deterrence at European level. German, Polish, Baltic, and other leaders are already taking this issue very seriously. Closely linked in military and nuclear terms, Paris and London should devise and conceptualize a European-wide deterrence doctrine capable of countering the Kremlin’s nuclear posturing. The two capitals could coordinate their SSBN (nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine) patrols in order to reinforce the principle of permanent presence at sea, which guarantees the invulnerability of deterrence capabilities. As the United Kingdom no longer has an air component, it would be up to France to deploy Rafale aircraft, armed with airborne nuclear missiles, on the territory of willing countries, within the framework of bilateral agreements¹⁰. These countries would participate in “logistical support for nuclear operations” (opening of bases, air defense, and in-flight refueling). Ultimately, some form of “nuclear sharing” with a dual-key system should be considered. In short, NATO mechanisms would have to be replicated, but without the United States, which would involve the creation of a European Nuclear Planning Group (NPC)¹¹.

Conclusion

The most important thing initially is to rearm, in order to have the military means to broaden the range of possibilities. This crucial point raises the question of power. Power does not lie in the lyricism of dreamers, voluntarism, or the ability to seduce (the much-abused “soft power,” curiously mentioned by the 2025 NSS). Power is defined as the ability to act forcefully to impose one’s will, which already presupposes that one has the necessary means of action. Finally, it is important to grasp the spirit of the times, which is what the concept of the “Machiavellian moment” expresses: “moment” in the sense of a point of temporal compression and accumulation of energies; “Machiavellian” referring to 16th-Century Italy, when the furia francese (French fury) upset the balance between the cities and principalities of the peninsula. In truth, the situation is much more serious, and the convergence of dramatic lines brings to mind the huge battles of mythology. Europe is experiencing an epoch-making moment.

Jean-Sylvestre Mongrenier

Associate professor of history and geography and researcher at the French Institute of Geopolitics (University of Paris VIII). Author of several books, he works within the Thomas More Institute on geopolitical and defense issues in Europe. His research areas cover the Baltic-Black Sea region, post-Soviet Eurasia, and the Mediterranean.

1. The grand strategy of offshore balancing, conceptualized by John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, could be seen as the theoretical foundation of the 2025 NSS. However, the approach is much cruder and marked by MAGA ideology. As for the praxis, implemented by Donald Trump and his emissaries, promoters, and financiers, it is characterized by a business-mindedness and nepotism that should disturb neo-realist theorists, who are fond of their scientifically pretentious models.
2. French diplomat Michel Duclos refers to a “neurotic” relationship with Europe, which is the mother of America and the cradle of the contemporary West. See Michel Duclos, “Le réarmement des Européens est le seul moyen de s’affranchir de la tutelle de l’Amérique” (The rearmament of Europeans is the only way to free themselves from American tutelage), Le Figaro, December 11, 2025.
3. On the Monroe Doctrine (which only became a doctrine at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries) and its so-called ‘isolationist’ context, see Jean-Sylvestre Mongrenier, “The Trump Mortgage. Historical analysis of unlikely American isolationism – Appendix: What about the Monroe Doctrine?”, Institut Thomas More, Note d’actualité 91, April 2024.
4. Note the Jacobin tone of the MAGA clan’s rhetoric, which breaks with that of the Founding Fathers, who were horrified by revolutionary France in 1793.
5. Under the aegis of France and the United Kingdom, which have taken up this Czech initiative, the coalition of volunteers includes Germany, Poland, Denmark, Sweden, the Baltic States, Italy, Spain, Turkey, Canada, and Australia. NATO and the European Union, as such, are also members. On July 10, 2025, it was decided to establish the coalition’s headquarters in Paris.
6. The Reassurance Force’s mission would be to help rebuild the Ukrainian armed forces, secure the airspace (air and missile defense), and protect maritime routes in the Black Sea (Turkey’s role would be crucial). It could have between 20,000 and 30,000 soldiers, deployed in western Ukraine and at key infrastructure sites, with support from the United States (logistics, satellite intelligence, rapid reaction force). Many “volunteers” are making their direct participation conditional on the existence of such a mechanism (a backstop). The fact is that the units deployed in Ukraine would have to be able to move forward to plug any gaps along the front line. However, such support remains highly hypothetical.
7. On this central issue, the unofficial comments made by members of the Pentagon regarding the handover between the Americans and Europeans must be taken at face value.
8. On May 27, 2025, EU foreign ministers agreed on a 65% European content for joint arms purchases made under the SAFE program. While negotiations with the United Kingdom to give its manufacturers access to these financial resources have not yet been concluded, there are other frameworks for military-industrial cooperation on both sides of the Channel. Finally, Canada should be able to participate in this scheme.
9. In the event of total withdrawal by the United States, its nuclear deterrence strategy extended to its European allies would vanish; American nuclear weapons (B61-12 bombs) distributed across Europe (Germany, Belgium, Italy, United Kingdom) and Turkey would be repatriated.
10. See Laurent Lagneau, “The United Kingdom is considering reacquiring an airborne nuclear component,” Opex360.Com, June 1, 2025.
11. Jean-Sylvestre Mongrenier, “An extended nuclear deterrent in Europe without the United States?” Desk Russie, November 16, 2025.