On the eve of municipal elections, the author offers a lucid and informed analysis of the political situation in Georgia. It leaves little hope for political renewal.
On October 4, Georgians will go to the polls for municipal elections to elect mayors and county councilors1. It remains to be seen how many will turn out: for many, given the ongoing democratic regression, the election makes little sense.
The October 2024 legislative elections reinforced the Georgian Dream party’s dominance in Parliament, but their results remain contested by the opposition. September 23 marked the 300th day of protests: citizens from all walks of life continue to gather in the country’s major cities—every evening in the capital, Tbilisi—to demand that the results be annulled and new elections held. In this context, the current Parliament and, with it, the new President of Georgia, Mikheil Kavelashvili—elected by MPs in December 2024—are not legitimate in the eyes of these citizens.
Democratic decline and pro-Russia shift
The current crisis is part of a continuing democratic decline in Georgia. Since 2022, the movement has been accompanied by an overt rapprochement with Moscow, orchestrated behind the scenes by the founder of Georgian Dream and the country’s real strongman, Bidzina Ivanishvili, an oligarch who made his fortune in Russia. Geopolitically, Tbilisi remains officially pro-West—the goals of joining the European Union and NATO have been enshrined in the Constitution since 2017—but refuses to sanction Russia and even avoids mentioning it in speeches about the war in Ukraine. Moreover, the European Union is accused of being a “war party” seeking to open a front in the Caucasus: rhetoric that reflects growing mistrust of Brussels2 and was at the heart of the 2024 legislative campaign.
This international shift has been accompanied by highly controversial domestic measures: the conviction of Nika Gvaramia in the midst of negotiations with the EU, a bill on “foreign agents” directly inspired by the Russian model, and an offensive against NGOs, accused among other things of promoting “homosexual culture” – a discourse modeled on Kremlin rhetoric. Behind this ideological convergence and authoritarian crackdown, well-identified networks of influence are at work.
First and foremost is the Georgian Orthodox Church. During the latest elections, its growing influence was reflected in Sunday sermons that repeated the government’s slogans almost word for word: calls for “peace” and denunciations of the “Western peril.” This religious politicization takes on a particular dimension because of its close ties to Moscow, revealed by massive leaks in 2021. These document the pressure exerted by the Moscow Patriarchate on appointments to key positions in the Georgian Church and the regular contacts between certain hierarchs and the Russian security services.
Next, there are the business networks. After the adoption of European sanctions, part of Russia’s foreign trade shifted to its southern partners, turning Georgia into an economic hub for flows to and from Russia. Far from joining the sanctions, the Georgian government welcomed the increase in trade and investment. Some strategic sectors, where close ties have long existed between Russian or Georgian business leaders based in Moscow on the one hand, and members of Georgian Dream on the other, are particularly affected by this explosion in bilateral trade. We will simply give a few emblematic examples here:
- Energy — Lukoil and businessman Othar Partskhaladze, sanctioned by the U.S. State Department;
- Extractive industries — The Chiatura mine, owned by Russian oligarch Mikhail Sotsky, at the center of a scandal in 2025. Sotsky is suspected of paying bribes to Bidzina Ivanishvili;
- Mineral water — The iconic Borjomi brand, controlled by the Alfa Group owned by billionaire Mikhail Fridman, who is close to Vladimir Putin;
- Telecommunications — Tycoon Fridon Injia, associated with several Russian partners, runs companies in the sector. Until 2024, he was a member of parliament for the Alliance of Patriots, an openly pro-Russia party.
Faced with this democratic setback, militant mobilizations, as well as warnings from international NGOs and Western partners, have multiplied — to no avail. On the contrary, the Georgian government suspended the process of accession to the European Union on November 28, 2024. The decision sparked outrage in a society where around 80% of citizens say they support accession. As for closer ties with Moscow, there is far from a consensus: even among Georgian Dream supporters, many point out that 20% of the country’s territory (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) remains occupied by Russia. Despite the sanctions imposed by Brussels and Washington, the government has so far turned a deaf ear to pressure, whether from abroad or from the streets.
Municipal election boycott
Under these circumstances, the main opposition parties—including the United National Movement (UNM), founded by former President Mikheil Saakashvili—have announced that they will not field candidates in next week’s elections. Former President Salome Zurabishvili has joined them in calling for a boycott, and it is likely that the call will be widely heeded.
Nothing in the government’s attitude gives any hope that the election will offer the necessary guarantees to prevent the massive fraud seen in previous elections. In fact, everything points to the contrary. Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze long refused to allow OSCE observers to be present, before changing his mind on September 6—too short a time frame for the organization to deploy a mission. Even Georgian associations of independent observers, which were very active during the 2024 legislative elections, have chosen not to participate, including ISFED, GYLA, and Observers. This marks a break with a well-established tradition of election observation in Georgia. Citizens will have to make do with international missions that can only be described as “compliant” – a dozen in all: the National Electoral Council of Ethiopia, the Central Election and Referendum Commission of Kyrgyzstan, and other pompous and distant committees.
Meanwhile, the government is stepping up pressure on political parties through judicial repression: in the last six months, ten leaders – particularly those of the MNU and the four parties of the Coalition for Change – have been charged and imprisoned for administrative or criminal offenses. Zurab Japaridze of the More Freedom party, along with Mamuka Khazaradze and Badri Japaridze of Lelo, were sentenced to seven and eight months in prison, respectively, for refusing to testify before a parliamentary commission investigating crimes committed under Saakashvili’s presidency—they, like many others, denounce this as a witch hunt. Hélène Khochtaria was arrested on September 15 for spray-painting graffiti on a campaign poster for the incumbent mayor of Tbilisi. The political motive leaves little room for doubt, particularly in the latter case. Others have chosen exile, such as Giorgi Gakharia, former prime minister and defector from Georgian Dream, once tipped for the Tbilisi mayoralty, who has found refuge in Germany.
The two leaders of Lelo have since been granted a presidential pardon, and their party is maintaining its participation in the election against all odds. These decisions fuel voters’ suspicions of collusion with the authorities and accentuate divisions within the opposition. Tako Tsatskrialachvili, whose NGO Let’s Do It Georgia had to close down following the new law on “foreign agents,” said from Akhaltsikhe: “Lelo and Gakharia’s party, For Georgia, should refrain from participating so as not to legitimize Georgian Dream.” Flora Pachulia, a lawyer in Kutaisi, has decided to boycott the elections, even though she is not entirely convinced: “As the parties are weakened at both the national and local levels, I think their participation in the elections could have strengthened the spirit of resistance locally.”
Georgia’s capital, along with a few other large cities (Batumi, Kutaisi, etc.), are the only constituencies where a real electoral battle could have taken place. Elsewhere, Georgian Dream dominates the campaigns: it already heads 63 of the 64 sakrebulo (district councils). The difficulties encountered during last year’s legislative elections are even more acute for the municipal elections. Divided, the opposition parties are not fielding joint candidates and suffer from a lack of local presence. This situation leaves the field open for local authorities to intimidate protesters and divert administrative resources during the campaign, then exploit the full range of “electoral technologies” on election day—as methods of vote manipulation are known.
Like the neighboring authoritarian regimes in Turkey and Russia, the popularity of Georgian Dream will be measured primarily by voter turnout. The real stakes of these elections will therefore be decided outside the ballot box.
Voting with their feet
In Tbilisi, the daily protests have moved from the Parliament to the campaign headquarters of the incumbent mayor, Kakha Kaladze, a former soccer player who has become a prominent figure in Georgian Dream. The real showdown will not take place until October 4, when a massive march is expected in the capital, with the likely participation of citizens from across the country. Calls to join the movement are multiplying, relayed by parties and activist groups as well as ordinary citizens. Tako plans to participate with his friends from Akhaltsikhe.
Nevertheless, even as the day approaches, the opposition remains fragmented: some leaders are calling for the overthrow of the government, or even a revolution, while others remain more cautious, continuing to demand new parliamentary elections and the release of political prisoners. As observed over the past year, mobilization is increasingly organized outside traditional parties, through corporations (civil servants, students, doctors, etc.) and various civil society groups.
So far, even at its peak in November 2024, this protest has not shaken the government. While the arrests of prominent political figures suggest a degree of nervousness, the situation is unlikely to change, as the repressive arsenal has been considerably strengthened.
Cases of foreign journalists turned away at the border and restrictions on press freedom have been mounting since the beginning of the year: one cameraman was detained for eight days for filming the arrests of protesters, another was punished for a Facebook post, and journalists from Netgazeti and OC Media were repeatedly fined 5,000 GEL (approximately $1,500) for “blocking traffic” while covering the protests. What these journalists have in common is that they all work for opposition media outlets.
The case of Mzia Amaglobeli, a renowned journalist and co-founder of Netgazeti and Batumebeli, who was prosecuted for slapping a police officer, caused an uproar that reached the European Parliament. In August, after six months of proceedings, she was sentenced to two years in prison.
Beyond these targeted attacks, the entire media ecosystem is threatened by a series of five laws passed in 2025, restricting freedom of expression and media funding opportunities. In this context, two major media outlets, Mtavari TV and Batumebeli, have had to close down for financial reasons.
The heavy sentences handed down to activists and journalists and widely condemned by human rights organizations, are dampening the determination of protesters. And for those who are not discouraged, violence against protesters—whether by the police or the titushki3—remains a real risk.
More than just an election, October 4 will be a test: how many Georgians will still dare to challenge a regime that has locked down the country? During the Rose Revolution of 2003, no fewer than 30,000 demonstrators stormed the Parliament—but it was only after the army joined them that President Shevardnadze agreed to negotiate a democratic transition. Without the support of key players, such as members of the current government, high-ranking military officers, or other intermediaries of power, it is difficult to imagine that October 4 will produce any results.
Renan Avelvor has worked for ten years with international NGOs in the countries of the former USSR. He is interested in the lives of his contemporaries and in the transformations of states. He is the author of Chronicles of a Never-Ending War: One Year of Humanitarian Work in Ukraine.
Footnotes
- A “municipality” in Georgia is equivalent to a French department or a large urban area. These elections correspond to French municipal and departmental elections.
- Sergi Kapanadze, “Anatomy of Georgia’s U-Turn toward Russia,” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, March 28, 2022.
- Thugs recruited to intimidate, assault, or disperse protesters.