Behind Russia, Communist China: The West Faces the Strengthening of a Eurasian Axis

At the last summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), held from August 31 to September 1, 2025, in Tianjin, a Chinese port city on the shores of the Bohai Gulf, the People’s Republic of China (i.e., communist China) and Russia brought together Eurasia and part of the Global South. This comes at a time when Donald Trump’s escapades and Europe’s inherent weaknesses are having an impact. However, we must rise to the challenge and stand together.

Notwithstanding the revolutionary break sought by Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which seized power in 1949, the People’s Republic of China (1.4 billion inhabitants and 9.6 million sq km, the third largest country in the world), commonly referred to as “Communist China” (i.e., communist), sees itself as the heir to the Chinese Empire and its civilization. Formerly known as the “Middle Kingdom” (Zhongguo), China was then a kind of civilization-state (a “world empire”) located at the center of a series of concentric circles. On the periphery were the so-called “barbarian” countries (Yi), subordinated within a hierarchical system of allegiances: “The Empire, it was said, has no neighbors,” meaning that China recognized only tributaries. In fact, despite dynastic unrest and invasions, the “Middle Kingdom” dominated the Far East for a long time (Chinese hegemony is an ancient phenomenon).

However, this empire, which reached its greatest extent under the Manchu Qing dynasty (1644-1911), gradually stagnated and entered into crisis at the end of the 18th Century, even before the British and French burst onto its geopolitical scene (see the Opium Wars, whose importance has perhaps been exaggerated) . The decline led to the “humiliations” of the 19th Century, its so-called “unequal” treaties, and the catastrophes of the 20th Century, namely the collapse of the empire, wars, and the terrible human toll of Sino-Maoism. This history, written according to the ideological criteria of the CCP, whose vision is sometimes echoed by foreign observers, serves as a justification for the total power of the party-state and its geopolitical program; the long stagnation of the Maoist period (1949-1976), the regression compared to the achievements of the Republic of China (based in Formosa/Taiwan since 1949) under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, the mass terror, and the quasi-civil war caused by the Cultural Revolution are all glossed over1.

After Mao Zedong’s death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping and the CCP launched a series of reforms that gave rise to a hybrid system: a single-party regime and a controlled opening to global capitalism. These reforms enabled China to enter a phase of economic expansion and propelled it to second place in the world economy (18% of global GDP). Internationally, the “smile diplomacy” aimed to reassure countries in the region, but since the economic and financial crisis of 2008, Beijing has been asserting its power in its geopolitical environment and globally2. Since neo-Maoist Xi Jinping came to power, he has considered the state capitalism of his predecessors to be a detour on the path to a Chinese form of communism (a digital communism based on “artificial intelligence”), the openly proclaimed goal is to make the People’s Republic of China the world’s leading superpower, replacing the United States, with the centenary of the communists’ seizure of power (2049) as the target date. The launch in 2013 of the “New Silk Roads” program (the Belt and Road Initiative) is a manifestation of this global geopolitical ambition.

This grand design has a dual dimension, continental and maritime. On the continental level, beyond asserting Chinese power in Asia, to the detriment of India, the idea is to organize Eurasia in its broadest sense, in alliance with Russia, which China is supporting in its war in Ukraine, with this ally playing the role of strategic and energy “rear guard” in the context of the Sino-American confrontation. On this point, we should emphasize the importance of the Sino-Russian agreement on the construction of a new gas pipeline (Power of Siberia 2) from the Yamal Peninsula to Chinese territory3; it will reduce dependence on Middle Eastern hydrocarbons imported from the Middle East via the Strait of Malacca, a key hub of globalization controlled by the U.S. Navy (the “Malacca dilemma”). Furthermore, the importance of political, diplomatic, military, and technical-industrial cooperation between Beijing and Moscow cannot be overlooked, against a backdrop of ideological collusion, information warfare, and major controversy with the West.

In naval and maritime terms, the objective is to conquer the island state of Taiwan, the central link in the first chain of islands (from Japan to the Philippines), and to take over most of the “Asian Mediterranean” (notably the South and East China Seas) . Already, the People’s Republic of China’s navy, which will soon deploy its fourth aircraft carrier, constitutes a projection force and asserts its presence in the western Pacific Ocean, near the American island of Guam (the rear base of the American presence in the Asia-Pacific region) . The People’s Republic of China is undergoing a thalassocratic shift4, a prerequisite for its transformation into a global superpower and world domination, prepared on a metapolitical level with the revival of the ancient concept of Tianxia (“All under Heaven”). This is a broad outline of the “Chinese Dream,” underpinned by the conviction of the inevitable decline of the West and liberal democracies.

Nearly a quarter of a century after the founding of the SCO in 2001, the summit meeting of this organization in Tianjin from August 31 to September 1, 2025, is seen by many experts and observers as the consecration of China’s grand strategy and the anticipation of a new world order, especially as the spectacle contrasted with that of the Trump administration, whose foreign policy is somewhat erratic, with the trade war against India, for example, prompting Narendra Modi to visit China for the first time in seven years, where he appeared alongside Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin. Never before has an SCO summit brought together so many heads of state and government. In addition to the ten member states, sixteen states with “observer” or ‘partner’ status were represented, as well as many so-called “emerging” countries, from Egypt to Malaysia, and even two member countries of Euro-Atlantic bodies (the European Union and NATO), namely Hungary and Slovakia. The People’s Republic of China and its “Eurasian circle” (the SCO) now account for half of the world’s population and nearly a quarter of global GDP.

With several of the world’s leading oil and gas producers within its ranks, the SCO has colossal energy reserves, mainly absorbed by the People’s Republic of China, whose trading companies (controlled by the Chinese party-state) resell part of them on the world market, giving Beijing the ability to influence world prices and the supply strategies of third countries (economists refer to this as market power). Diplomatic reach demonstrated by the Tianjin summit, Beijing is positioning itself as the center of “Sino-globalization” (Emmanuel Dubois de Prisque). Added to this is the display of military power by the PLA (People’s Liberation Army), which has been steadily modernized and equipped with new hardware (aircraft carriers, missiles of all kinds, drones, anti-satellite weapons, etc.). The guiding principle behind this major military effort is to drive the Americans out of the Asian Mediterranean and, subsequently, the Western Pacific.

Beyond the SCO, which acts as a counterweight to the West, the People’s Republic of China is organizing other circles of friends and partners, within the framework of BRICS+ (see the participation of Brazil and South Africa), within the Global South5, or through major regional and continental forums: with African leaders in September 2024, those of the Pacific Islands and then Latin American countries in the spring of 2025. In parallel with these efforts, which aim to establish a geosystem favorable to the interests and global ambitions of the People’s Republic of China, Beijing has not neglected to invest in the international system whose foundations were laid by the United States and its allies after World War II (the UN and its various agencies). At the same time, the ideologues of the party-state (the CCP) are developing a revisionist narrative that portrays China (that of Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang) and the USSR as the main opponents of the Axis and the true victors of World War II. This thesis, relayed to the Chinese population through numerous channels (official speeches, films, documentaries, exhibitions, etc.), is supposed to legitimize a project of world domination (the “Chinese Dream “).

One might object that China’s major diplomatic maneuvers bring together countries with varying profiles, motivations, and goals, or that the display of PLA military equipment is not a demonstration of power: the PLA has not fought for decades. But the effective ability of Chinese diplomacy to bring together so many different countries is indeed the mark of a rising superpower, capable of shaping an environment favorable to its positions and its domineering impulses (a conducive environment). As for military power, the PLA is learning by studying the conduct of the war in Ukraine, cooperating with Russia in many areas, and supporting Pakistan against India in the military-industrial sphere. Finally, American missteps and the doubt sown among the United States’ allies are opening up a boulevard for the People’s Republic of China and its allies. This is indeed a challenge to the “global West.”

Before the start of the military parade in Beijing on September 3rd // kremlin.ru

In short, the combined action of the People’s Republic of China and Putin’s Russia is giving shape and substance to a “Greater Eurasia,” a prospect that haunted British geographer Halford Mackinder (1861-1947) and, following him, classical Anglo-American geopolitics. We know the importance it attached to the concept of the Heartland, to the Russian-Siberian world and, by extension, to Eurasia, a vast geopolitical entity that is virtually unified or united, capable of mobilizing sufficient resources to challenge the supremacy of the West and the free nations, a supremacy based geostrategically on control of the sea. According to this school of thought, the geopolitical unification of the Heartland would tip the global balance. Well, here we are! While Russia is methodically destroying Ukraine and testing NATO’s resolve and response by violating the airspace of Poland and Romania, the People’s Republic of China, without whose support Russia’s long war in Ukraine would not be possible, is strengthening its Eurasian foundations, expanding its diplomatic positions in the Global South, and challenging the Americans to maintain their own positions in the Asian Mediterranean and the Western Pacific.

If the West were still an orderly and stable world, the “burden sharing” between the United States and its European allies, from the Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific, would be self-evident: a Europeanized NATO facing Russia, in which the United States would perpetuate its extended deterrence, maintain troops on the “eastern flank”—which is in the process of transforming into an eastern front6—and continue to provide what European armies still lack (satellite intelligence, anti-aircraft and anti-missile defenses, logistical transport, and other strategic “enablers”); European allies would step up their game, taking on new tasks and responsibilities resulting from the necessary redeployment of some U.S. resources between different geopolitical theaters (a general review is currently underway). Most of the support for Ukraine, NATO’s frontline shield, would in the near future be provided by European allies. In short, “leadership by behind7” that would allow for transitions, thus avoiding a possible breakdown of the balance on the “eastern flank.” In return, Western countries would coordinate their policies towards China and in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly in the Asian Mediterranean. In the same spirit, a common geo-economic front could be formed, but with more intelligent and targeted measures than a brutal, undifferentiated increase in customs tariffs, which would be counterproductive.

Unfortunately, the Trump administration’s missteps, the vain intellectual games of theorists enamored with their models of “Nixon in reverse,” and the U.S. president’s stated preference for all-out trade wars, with no other criteria for assessment than a pseudo-cost/benefit analysis, give rise to fears of the worst. In truth, could Trump’s denunciation of China be a smokescreen for a general retreat, with the “great entrenchment” in the Western hemisphere (over which Washington no longer has effective control) turning out to be a great renunciation? Are migration control and protectionism taking the place of foreign policy? In any case, Donald Trump’s hostile and humiliating attitude toward India—motivated more by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s refusal to open his country to American agricultural products than by the purchase of Russian oil8 – has already pushed the latter toward the Sino-Russian axis. This may be temporary, but it is enough to aggravate the situation and alter the balance of power. Such amateurism and inconsistency demonstrate a great deal of indifference. Unless it is a psychological and intellectual flaw, as suggested by Vladimir Putin’s ascendancy over his counterpart and the contempt he shows him, with no real consequences in the White House, where people grumble.

To conclude

We have little doubt that the creation of a Sino-Russian Greater Eurasia is ultimately directed against the United States, which Beijing and Moscow see as a declining power. But for the moment, their European allies, on the front line on the western fringes of this Eurasian bloc, may find themselves alone in facing the machinations of “Russia-Eurasia,” not to mention Ukraine, which has been transformed into a geostrategic glacis. Admittedly, NATO is still in place, the military high command is planning, procedures have been tested, and the latest Russian provocations have led to Operation Eastern Sentinel (the reinforcement of the “eastern flank”). But what about the day when an exceptional situation arises, when the preservation of being will require sovereign assertions and radical denials? Would it be reasonable to keep trusting the words of the U.S. president, who keeps saying one thing and then its opposite? It is therefore important that European nations show foresight and anticipate the worst. That they welcome the continuity of the American political and strategic commitment in Europe, which is in fact uncertain (the Latin perenne, translated as “eternity,” also means “for the year”), and that they take responsibility.

In the immediate term, this means destroying any aircraft that violate NATO airspace and extending an anti-aircraft and anti-missile defense zone to Ukraine, at least in the western part of the country, which should be transformed into a defensive stronghold in the event that the front line is breached. As a precautionary measure, such a system should be extended to Moldova, without waiting for that country to be openly attacked. Fundamentally, the important thing is to rearm and finance the Ukrainian military apparatus and to plan for a European military deployment, which could take place despite the absence of any agreement with Russia. At the political-strategic level, the overall objective is to rely simultaneously on NATO and European Union structures to organize a pan-European geopolitical space, from the Far North to the Mediterranean and from the Atlantic to the Don basin: a Pan-Europe driven by a G-4 (France, United Kingdom, Germany, Poland), possibly expanded to include other willing nations (Ukraine in the short term). Such a geopolitical arrangement would not resolve the issue of China or the challenges in the Indo-Pacific, which also concern Europe, but it would help to keep Russia in check and give the forces of dislocation time to produce their effects.

Welding a joint during the ceremony marking the assembly of the first section of the Power of Siberia gas pipeline, September 1, 2014 // kremlin.ru

Focus: the “Power of Siberia” gas pipeline

Inaugurated on December 2, 2019, “Power of Siberia” is a gas pipeline that now transports 38 billion cubic meters per year to the People’s Republic of China (10% of China’s annual consumption at the time of inauguration). It connects the gas fields of Chayanda and Kovykta (Eastern Siberia) to Blagoveshchensk on the Russian bank of the Amur River, where Chinese infrastructure takes over, covering a distance of approximately 3,000 kilometers (Blagoveshchensk and Heihei on the Chinese bank constitute a free trade zone). Launched in 2014, this $55 billion gas pipeline project is a concrete expression of the rapprochement between Beijing and Moscow, whose geopolitical partnership can be compared to an alliance. On September 2, 2025, Alexei Miller, CEO of the Russian state-owned group Gazprom, announced that future work would increase the capacity of Force Siberia to 44 billion cubic meters per year. More importantly, Alexei Miller announced on the same day the signing of a legally binding memorandum on the construction of a new gas pipeline, “Power of Siberia 2,” which will transport oil from the Arctic Yamal Peninsula (Kharasavey and Bovanenkovo fields) to China via Mongolia. The volume of gas transported will be 50 billion cubic meters, or one-tenth of China’s current consumption. In short, Russian gas that was previously exported to Europe will now be delivered to China. Some in Europe are disparaging this new project, arguing that the price of Russian gas charged to China will be significantly lower than that (still) sold to European importers (the “Power of Siberia 2” contract is valued at $450 billion over 30 years). In 2024, this amounted to 47.7 billion cubic meters, compared to the 177 billion imported by Europe in 2021, the year preceding Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine. In truth, the geopolitical significance of this agreement, in other words the confirmation of Russia’s Asian orientation (“Russia-Eurasia” versus the West), is more important than the commercial dimension: a Sino-Russian “Greater Eurasia” is taking shape and asserting itself on the international stage. Beyond its own needs, China is buying increasing volumes of gas (half of the world’s LNG/liquefied natural gas production) to resell on the world market; its energy companies (mainly Petrochina International, Unipec, and Cnooc) operate in the major financial centers, in the trading sector, to acquire market power. Added to this are the signing of long-term contracts and multiple investments in gas projects abroad. In fact, the United States is Europe’s major energy supplier, which poses problems of a different order. Nevertheless, the reality of the situation tempers the harsh criticism levelled at Ursula von der Leyen when, in a political statement rather than a strict trade agreement, the President of the European Commission committed to increasing gas purchases from the United States (July 27, 2025). European purchases of Russian gas, particularly LNG shipments, are expected to end in 2027, and there are few alternatives.

Associate professor of history and geography and researcher at the French Institute of Geopolitics (University of Paris VIII). Author of several books, he works within the Thomas More Institute on geopolitical and defense issues in Europe. His research areas cover the Baltic-Black Sea region, post-Soviet Eurasia, and the Mediterranean.

Footnotes

  1. See Jean-Sylvestre Mongrenier, Les falsifications historiques du discours géopolitique chinois (The Historical Falsifications of Chinese Geopolitical Discourse), Key Points 24, June 2020, Institut Thomas More.
  2. This financial and economic crisis is perceived in Beijing as a manifestation of the incompetence of the Americans, the architects of globalization, and one of the first signs that China’s time has come.
  3. This agreement was announced on September 2, 2025. See the “Siberian Force” focus at the end of this article.
  4. See Hugues Eudeline, Géopolitique de la Chine, une nouvelle thalassocratie (Geopolitics of China, a new thalassocracy), Presses universitaires de France, 2024.
  5. See Jean-Sylvestre Mongrenier, “From the BRICS to the Global South: Beijing and Moscow at the helm,” Desk Russie, September 16, 2023.
  6. In addition to hybrid warfare in the Baltic region and on the territory of several NATO member countries, drones are now being sent into their airspace (most recently in Poland and Romania).
  7. First used during the war in Libya (2011), led by France and Great Britain with the support of the United States, the expression “leadership by behind” was presented as a kind of oxymoron. It should be noted, however, that the term “action” (actus, actio in Latin) comes from the verb “agere,” which means “to push forward,” a pastoral metaphor that expresses the way in which a herd is led. Agere is opposed to ducere: “to walk in front .”
  8. It is also important to take into account Donald Trump’s boasts about the peace he allegedly imposed between India and Pakistan (the Indo-Pakistani crisis of April-May and the ceasefire of May 10), and even more so the reception given by the U.S. president to the head of the Pakistani army. In return, the Indian prime minister’s refusal to attribute the end of the Indo-Pakistani military escalation to Donald Trump reportedly offended the latter, who was seeking a Nobel Peace Prize.