The Atlantic summit in The Hague (June 24-26, 2025) has granted additional time to the United States’ European allies. Thanks are due to NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, who has deployed a wealth of diplomatic skills in recent months to prevent Donald Trump from acting on his impulses, which would have been detrimental to the political and military credibility of the Atlantic Alliance. The question now is what we will do with this extra time: arming Ukraine comes first. This requires the seizure of Russian state assets.
Pending the general review of the U.S. armed forces, the results of which should be known after the summer, we must already prepare to take over from American soldiers who will be redeployed to other theaters and fill the resulting capability gaps on NATO’s eastern flank1. More generally, European armies will have to develop programs to acquire what the military calls “enablers”: satellite intelligence, strategic transport, anti-aircraft and anti-missile defenses, and deep strike capabilities. These capabilities exist in Europe, but they are insufficient in number. This will be a multi-year effort, with a target date of 2030-2035.
This timeframe corresponds to the time needed to compensate for three decades of unilateral disarmament, especially since many European countries are heavily indebted. But from Ukraine’s perspective, it seems disconnected from military realities, both tactical and strategic. In fact, the priority must be to finance the Ukrainian war effort, which is Europe’s and NATO’s first line of defense on their eastern front. This means buying from the U.S. and other countries the equipment that the European arms industry is not immediately capable of producing. How? By confiscating Russia’s financial assets.
Three hundred billion dollars are at stake, including more than two hundred billion in Europe. A windfall for Ukraine and its international supporters. These are the assets of the Russian Central Bank held in Europe and the United States, frozen by Western governments shortly after the launch of the “special military operation” against Ukraine on February 24, 2022. The largest share of these assets is held by Euroclear, an international fund depository based in Belgium. The decision was taken by the leaders of the major Western democracies, meeting within the Group of Seven (G7). At the end of 2024, the same leaders decided to use the interest generated by these assets to finance Ukraine. It is now time to move up a gear.
While the High Representative of the European Union, Kaja Kallas, some EU heads of government, including Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, and several national political figures support such a decision, French President Emmanuel Macron, former German Chancellor Olaf Scholz (at the time), European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde, lawyers, and experts are reluctant. Their arguments are primarily legal, arguing that the decision to confiscate these assets violates the principle of “immunity from execution” (the sovereign privilege of states), which would set a precedent. However, some authoritative voices argue that such a measure would be a legitimate state countermeasure against an aggressor state to compensate the victim; the process would be legal under international law.
Other arguments are monetary and financial. Confiscating Russian assets would have adverse effects: such a decision would deter international investors from placing their funds in Europe and could trigger capital flight. The European currency and the financial stability of the eurozone would suffer, with serious effects on the sovereign debt market. Countries such as France, which need to refinance their debt, would suffer the consequences. Supporters of seizure point out that these fears were expressed when Russian state assets were frozen and then when it was decided to use the interest they generated to finance Ukraine. There was no backlash. Moreover, international investors have few alternatives to the dollar, the euro, the pound sterling, and the yen. These currencies account for nine-tenths of global currency reserves.
It is right and proper that politicians and experts should consider the adverse effects of a possible confiscation of Russian state assets (economists refer to “negative externalities”) in order to anticipate them. However, we see here the same hesitations that were previously expressed during the debates on the delivery of anti-tank weapons, then tanks, aircraft, and deep strike systems. Too little, too late. Once again, objections are out of step, far removed from the reality and depth of the conflict in Ukraine, as well as Vladimir Putin’s war ambitions in Europe. Are we to believe that the Kremlin leader would one day be prepared to pay compensation to Ukraine, which would then justify the return of Russian state assets? Or are we still harbouring the illusion of a forthcoming “reset” between Europe and Russia? That would be to misunderstand Putinism, the mindset of the siloviki, and their bellicose Eurasian imperialism.
Clearly, it would be preferable for the decision to confiscate the sums in question to be taken jointly by both sides of the Atlantic, within the framework of the G7. We know how much the U.S. president dislikes this format, but the failure of his attempt at a “reset” and his psychological reversal, if confirmed, would make it possible to consider the matter2. The very concrete nature of this measure, in line with some of his inclinations, could help. Even more so if it were to finance purchases of U.S. weapons. And if this were not the case, it would be up to the European allies to cross the Rubicon. In short, a sovereign affirmation that would mark a departure from invoking “European strategic autonomy” and the obligatory reference to a reified and hypostasized “liberal international order.” A sovereign does not argue, but takes action.
Associate professor of history and geography and researcher at the French Institute of Geopolitics (University of Paris VIII). Author of several books, he works within the Thomas More Institute on geopolitical and defense issues in Europe. His research areas cover the Baltic-Black Sea region, post-Soviet Eurasia, and the Mediterranean.