Ukraine: The Elephant in the Room

The author argues that Donald Trump’s trade war contributes – at least in its effects, if not in its intentions – to the war against the international order waged by Putin and his fellow dictators, and increases global chaos at a time when Europe’s security is at stake.

Since Donald Trump launched his “tariffs war” (tariffs being, according to the American president, the most beautiful word in the English language), another war – a real one this time, the war in Ukraine – has vanished from the media. Public attention is now monopolized by Trump’s trade war – first against the whole world, and more recently, according to the latest reports, against China. One could almost forget that Ukraine is once again occupying a piece of Russian territory, this time in the Belgorod region – a rather significant piece of news. Even LCI, the French news channel that had dedicated the most airtime to Ukraine, now follows the tariff saga full-time. Ukraine has been erased. This sudden amnesia is rather irrational and, dare I say, foolish.

Naturally, it is disastrous for the Ukrainians. As leaders and public opinion shift their attention elsewhere, the military and financial decisions of Ukraine’s allies – decisions that are vital since the American withdrawal – risk being delayed even further. The protection of Ukrainian airspace, awaited since day one of the war, is still pending – where are the Patriot missiles, the European fighter jets, essential to stop Putin’s savage war against Ukrainian cities? As the proverb goes, “out of sight, out of mind.”

But there’s more. Hypnotized by Trump’s latest maneuvers, we forget the failure of the previous one: the Ukrainian ceasefire. To achieve it, Trump was ready to make all sorts of concessions to Russia, essentially sacrificing Ukraine – and first of all, its president, whom he blamed for provoking the conflict, for being reluctant to repay American aid, and for not wearing a tie in the Oval Office. Trump and his entourage make no secret of their contempt – if not outright hatred – towards Ukraine. General Kellogg, once thought to be more sympathetic to Kyiv, now talks of partitioning Ukraine, modeled on post-WWII Berlin¹. But Russia isn’t playing along. It refuses the ceasefire and demands, as a precondition to stopping the fighting, that all issues concerning Europe’s security architecture (sic) be resolved on Russian terms. By changing the subject, Trump conveniently evades responsibility for his betrayal, his pettiness, and ultimately, his failure in the “Ukraine file” – as cynically noted by a French ambassador, long given to defeatist predictions: “Trump has decided to drop Ukraine and is looking for a graceful way to do it” (sic), which means: by diverting the world’s attention. And it works: the world now has eyes only for tariffs. And debates about the coherence or absurdity of U.S. policy, whether tariffs are the bluff of the self-proclaimed “deal king,” or a methodical effort to destroy free trade and its regulatory institutions. Until the next headline switch: “And now, dear viewers, the invasion of Greenland and the purchase of the Panama Canal” (or the reverse).

Not that the tariff war is a trivial matter. The risks of a stock market crash – or even a banking collapse – are very real, and China’s response will not stop at raising tariffs on U.S. imports. It will also need to find new markets for its gigantic surpluses, which are about to flood into Europe. This really is a promise of economic and geopolitical chaos. And here lies the height of media inconsistency: the dangers of the tariff war are so serious and alarming precisely because of the global war launched by the Kremlin in February 2022². Without the invasion of Ukraine, without the threat of war in Europe, Trump’s trade war would be a serious but ultimately routine episode – no more worrying than the protectionist measures he implemented during his first term. It is Putin’s war against the global West that makes Trump’s tariffs so dangerous. Europe’s economic security is a crucial issue only because its basic security is threatened by Russia. In other words, the war in Ukraine is the elephant in the room –unseen or deliberately ignored, though it is the root of global chaos.

In reality, Trump’s trade war contributes – again, at least in its effects – to the war against the international order led by Putin and his fellow autocrats. One doesn’t need to be a starry-eyed free-trade advocate to recall that the very foundation of the international legal order – based on the equal sovereignty of all states – has gone hand in hand with the promotion of international trade and the lowering of tariffs. The IMF was created in 1945, followed by the GATT³, the forerunner of the WTO, founded in 1995. Globalization, dominated by the dollar, is far from perfect – it has created serious social and ecological imbalances, and it needs correction and probably slowing down. But it is a system that has, up to now, benefited the majority of humanity. If it were to be replaced by the law of empires – in other words, the law of the strongest – it would be a disaster for the entire world, both for the beneficiaries and the victims of the liberal international order.

Philippe De Lara

Lecturer at the University of Paris II Panthéon-Assas. Teaches philosophy and political science.

1. “You could almost model this on what happened to Berlin after WWII, when you had a Russian zone, a French zone, a British zone, and an American zone,” General Kellogg told the Times of London. He added that Ukraine would have its own zone in the middle of the country along the left bank of the Dnipro River, separated from the Russian zone to the east by a 30 km-wide demilitarized zone.
2. Let’s not forget that Putin didn’t just invade Ukraine. He helps North Korea boost its nuclear arsenal, gave the green light for the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, and is allied with Iran.
3. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The GATT was a framework for ongoing multilateral trade negotiations (or rounds), originally established among 23 wealthy Western countries. It gradually expanded to include more products and more countries – 117 by 1994, just before the WTO replaced it.