The start of negotiations on the fate of Ukraine, which began with the meeting in Riyadh between Marco Rubio and Sergey Lavrov on February 18, raises many concerns. What about U.S. support for a free, sovereign, and independent Ukraine? As for the value of American security guarantees, even within NATO (the famous Article 5), it is wavering as never before in the history of the Atlantic Alliance: American diplomacy could yield to Russia over the whole of Central and Eastern Europe. There is an urgent need for greater political, strategic, and military autonomy for European allies.
As in the TV series Game of Thrones, Donald Trump reduces international relations to a perpetual game of purely tactical alliances and counter-alliances, to the detriment of what makes a nation or a civilization strong. While the level of the issues and threats involved in the major Sino-Russian geopolitical issue requires unity and strategic coordination among Western nations, from the Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific, the first weeks of the Trump Administration have jeopardized the future of Ukraine, that of Europe and, consequently, the United States’ alliance system in the world1.
Ukraine undefeated
First and foremost, it is important to refute the idea that Ukraine is on the verge of military defeat, with only American diplomatic intervention able to salvage something, at the cost of major concessions (recognition of territorial losses and abandonment of the NATO candidacy, and even more). Not only did the initial Russian plan – to take Kyiv in a few days and raze the Ukrainian nation state – fail, but even the capture of the whole of Donbas has not been achieved. Three years after the “special military operation” of February 24, 2022, the starting point of a high-intensity war, the Russian armed forces control less than a fifth of Ukraine’s territory. The other areas of confrontation also need be considered2. The Russian air force has not been able to gain control of the airspace and decapitate the Ukrainian political-military system through surgical strikes; recently, the (late) delivery of anti-aircraft equipment and fighter planes by the West has even made it possible to limit Russia’s strike power. In the Black Sea, Ukrainian naval drones and missiles have forced the Russian fleet to evacuate the ports of Crimea and retreat to those of Novorossiysk and the Caucasian coast. In cyberspace, the much-feared Russian blow, which was supposed to destroy Ukraine’s infrastructure, did not happen. Economically, Ukraine, with financial support from the West, is in working order: the agility of this war economy partially compensates for the Russian mass, especially since Ukraine retains some room for maneuver (the level of mobilization is lower than that of Israel). In short, the all-out war desired by the Kremlin has not defeated Ukraine, NATO’s advanced stronghold and shield. Western Europe should be aware that Ukraine’s resistance is delaying and thwarting Russian operations and provocations in other parts of the Old Continent; the strength of its army averts the worst.
The uncertainties of the Atlantic Alliance
And yet… The diplomacy of the Trump administration and its possible consequences (intentional objectives or perverse effects, i.e. unintended?) endanger this valiant and combative Ukraine. It is true that the Biden administration’s previous “crisis management” – instead of a “grand strategy” oriented toward positive goals – will have hampered arms deliveries to Ukraine, in terms of both quality and quantity, making it impossible to amplify the counter-offensive of summer 2022; Russia has had the time it needed to reorganize its military apparatus, set up a war economy, and mobilize international support, now united under the leadership of a Sino-Russian axis of destabilizing and revisionist powers. At least Ukraine, with no real prospect of victory, had the means to hold out, which it has been doing. Amateurism or shameless cynicism of the new administration? The re-establishment of the Trump-Putin duo (the former thundering while the latter weaves his web and sets his traps), the unveiling by Defense Secretary Peter Hegseth of the first American concessions (Brussels, February 12), the vindictive and inappropriate speech by Vice President J.D. Vance (Munich, February 15), raise fears of the worst for Ukraine and jeopardize the future of NATO, which has been shaken to its very foundations. One question keeps nagging us: is the American political-diplomatic leadership part of a “grand strategy”? In other words, a geopolitical redeployment that would have its rationality, like the mythical “Nixon in reverse” (turning Russia against China), or even a planetary Washington-Moscow-Beijing triumvirate. Or is this leadership under the sway of a form of millenarianism, in search of a mythical golden age, which would ultimately lead to the fall of the West, to the great benefit of the People’s Republic of China, Russia and the “Axis of Chaos3”?
Outline of a Europeanized NATO
In either case, Europe would be a variable to be adjusted, and it is vital that all or some of the European allies of the United States pull themselves together and stand united: the Old West would thus make up for the moral failings and geopolitical errors of the New West. In a way, what will be emphatically called the “Hegseth doctrine” (February 12, 2025) – namely an invitation to European allies to do much more at a politico-military level, to assume new responsibilities (while removing them from the negotiations on Ukraine) – invites them to do so. It is therefore important to mobilize in order to, on the one hand, continue Europe’s political, financial, and military-industrial support for Ukraine, and on the other hand, constitute a “reassurance force” that would support the implementation of a ceasefire or any peace agreement: a force of 40,000 to 50,000 troops, with the necessary air cover and logistical support. The effort is within the reach of the European states: it corresponds to the number of troops deployed in Bosnia and Kosovo at the end of the wars led by Serbia (with Russian support), or to the number of European soldiers sent to the Afghan theater. Beyond deployment in Ukraine, with or without the support of the United States, the guiding idea would be to Europeanize NATO in order to ensure a growing share of Europe’s defense. This would imply that Europeans would provide the funding, generate more military capabilities and arm command posts that would no longer be entrusted to American officers. In the Nordic-Baltic area as in the Black Sea/Mediterranean connection, enhanced cooperation between European nations would fight against the hybrid war that Russia is waging in these areas, thus testing their resolve and their defense systems. Finally, it will be necessary to conceptualize a Europe-wide doctrine of deterrence, which can counteract the Kremlin’s nuclear posturing and Russia’s strategy of aggressive sanctuary4.
What geopolitical prospects?
In the long term, such an undertaking cannot be maintained without a global geopolitical vision, i.e. a representation of oneself and of the world which, like a magnetic field, attracts collective efforts and the various vectors of an overall strategy. The grand design is to bring about a “geopolitical Europe”, from the Atlantic to the Don Basin, and from the Arctic to the Sicilian Sea. It could take the form of a flexible pan-European confederation, headed by a Security Council made up of a few nations, including the United Kingdom. This council would provide the impetus within the European Union and NATO. For the record, this was until now the function of the Atlantic Quad (United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany) for defense issues and the G7 (the same, plus Canada, Italy, and Japan) for economic affairs. In this way, “minilateralism” will compensate for the seeds of dispersion.
In addition to efforts to pool capabilities and rationalize military programs, various mechanisms and expedients – revision of budgetary rules, European funds, joint borrowing, recourse to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), founding of a Defense Bank, etc. – would be used to finance a major pan-European military effort, targeting a range of 3 to 5% of overall GDP, as during the Cold War. The immediate objective will be to counter Russian designs on Europe, which Russia would like to absorb into a Greater Eurasia, under the leadership of Beijing and Moscow. But we must look even further ahead: it is up to the Old West to make up for the geopolitical errors of the New West and to perpetuate the general spirit of our civilization, with the hope of a possible recovery of American politics, which in the past has experienced the limits of the “every man for himself” approach. The “neutrality laws” of the 1930s, let us remember, did not prevent the United States from suffering in a new world war.
Associate professor of history and geography and researcher at the French Institute of Geopolitics (University of Paris VIII). Author of several books, he works within the Thomas More Institute on geopolitical and defense issues in Europe. His research areas cover the Baltic-Black Sea region, post-Soviet Eurasia, and the Mediterranean.
Footnotes
- On the terms of the Russian-American negotiations and the Russian desire to assert the views set out in Putin’s ultimatum (a doctrine of the “close foreigner”, from post-Soviet Eurasia to the heart of Europe), issued on December 17, 2021, see “ US-Russia talks spark European fears of Ukraine settlement on Putin’s terms”, Financial Times, February 18, 2025. On the aforementioned ultimatum, see the analysis by Françoise Thom, Desk Russie, December 30, 2021.
- See Can Kasapoglu, ‘Ukraine Military Situation Report, February 12’, Hudson Institute.
- See Ruth Deyermond, “A Return to Spheres of influence? Don’t Be Silly”, CEPA, February 17, 2025.
- See Emmanuelle Maître, “The French nuclear deterrent and the European stake”, FRS, June 13, 2024.
