Ukrainians are less critical of Trump than other European nations, as they have lost faith in the Biden administration. However, Trump must think carefully not to fall into the Kremlin’s trap. Without strong security guarantees for Ukraine, the armistice will be worthless. That is why Ukraine will continue to fight, if these guarantees are not offered.
A year ago, when Donald Trump pledged to end the Russian-Ukrainian war with 24 hours, hardly anybody familiar (more or less) with the situation on the ground could have taken his promise at face value. A simple logic and rational thought suggested clearly that Russia would not be willing to accept such a deal unless it achieved its ultimate goal: dismantling of the Ukrainian state and erasure of nation, and that Ukraine would not be eager to yield to the pressure since its very existence is on the table, apparently non-negotiable. For Russians, there is no reason to compromise as long as they feel they advance and Ukraine retreats, while the West is seen as feckless, disarrayed and despicable. And for Ukraine, even though there might be a reason to suspend the fighting, to freeze the conflict and put off the request for justice until the next Russian perestroika, the lack of viable security guarantees against Russian further advances makes little sense of all armistice offers.
There has always been, of course, and still is a theoretical possibility that Donald Trump would opt for the seemingly simplest solution and stop any assistance for Ukraine. This is very unlikely, however, because neither the Congress nor the expert community nor American society would approve it and accept the disastrous consequences of such a move – both for the security and international reputation of the U.S.. And even then, Ukrainians would not give up anyway but continue resistance desperately, by default, since they see no alternative: neither do Russian politicians hide their genocidal intent – to extinguish both the Ukrainian state and the nation (“demilitarize” and “de-Nazify” in their code-words), nor do Russian practices in occupied territories leave any doubt about the Kremlin’s methods and goals.
Such resistance would certainly be even more exhaustive and costly than now, but Ukrainians would definitely persist: their trust in the leadership is still high, their determination is strong, and their own arms programs are being developed at full speed. However important American help may be (40% of all military supplies by now), one third of the armament is already produced by Ukrainians themselves (and the figure is growing steadily), while about 30% are provided by Europeans. And non-military support from the U.S. is notably lower, lagging behind the combined assistance from other states. In terms of percentage of GDP (0.4%), American allocations to Ukraine rank 16th, far behind many other states that allocate more than one and sometimes even two per cent of their GDP.
Mr. Trump has apparently bluffed with his ‘peacemaking’ promise (as with many others, to say the truth), – irresponsible and fantastic even at first glance. But the people’s desire for simple solutions and political miracles was so high that they not only voted him into the presidency in the U.S. but also expressed globally their high expectations and probably trust in him – as revealed in a representative survey carried out in 24 major countries last November (shortly after the US presidential election). A strong majority of respondents in India (82% vs 5%), Saudi Arabia (57 vs 19) and China (52 vs 14) said that the election of Trump is a good thing for peace in the world. The same opinion was expressed by a strong plurality of respondents in Russia (45 vs 10), South Africa (42 vs 28), Turkey (38 vs 30), Brazil (37 vs 31) and even in Ukraine (33 vs 18). A similar majority or plurality in the same countries believe that Trump will help to achieve peace in Ukraine: from 65 vs 11 in India and 61 vs 4 in Russia to 48 vs 16 in Turkey and 39 vs 35 in Ukraine itself. The same respondents, likewise, recognize Trump’s presidency as a good thig for their own country: 84 vs 6 in India, 61 vs 10 in Saudi Arabia, 49 vs 8 in Russia, 46 vs 18 in China. Again, Ukrainian hopes for Trump (26 vs 20) appeared to be the highest in Europe, which was generally (and exceptionally) skeptical about Trump’s presidency: from 54 vs 15 in the U.K. to 38 vs 22 in the EU, and 34 vs 23 in Switzerland.
In an insightful commentary on these results, Ivan Krastev of the Centre for Liberal Strategies in Sofia hypothesized that global approbation of Trump (besides Europe and South Korea) may reflect not only natural enthusiasm for a winner or sincere belief in his peacemaking zeal and efficacy, but also something more complicated and interesting: “Trump’s open disrespect for international rules is viewed by many in the non-western world as preferable to the unbearable hypocrisy of the previous liberal administration. Under Trump, the U.S. will finally become a normal great power – imperial but not crusading. It will no longer pretend to be better than all other countries, but rather act on the assumption that it is stronger than them”.
In particular, this might be the primary reason for Russian enthusiasm about Trump. As Krastev further contends, “Early moves by the Trump team signal that the president-elect has decided to demonstrate his power not by confronting America’s adversaries but by subduing Washington’s allies. Donald Trump’s claims on Greenland and Canada, and Elon Musk’s tweets calling for regime change in the UK, are the clearest indications of this gambit… EU member states have every reason to worry that Washington’s approach to them will echo former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev’s recent pronouncement that it is necessary to help any destructive processes in Europe”.
Ukrainians are more optimistic about Trump than all other Europeans, but still not so positive than all surveyed non-Europeans (with a graphical exception of South Koreans). Ukrainian optimism, though mild, still looks strange against Trump’s past ambiguous if not overtly insulting remarks on Ukraine and personally on Zelensky, let alone his threats to cut off the aid to Ukraine and strike a deal with Putin. Maybe his latest talks about “peace through strength” offset his past verbal faux-pas, but most likely it was the Ukrainians’ general disappointment in many of Western leaders and incumbent American leadership in particular that made them cautiously embrace Donald Trump as a possible (and, actually, the only available) alternative.
Within one year, between November 2023 and November 2024, the Ukrainians’ trust in all Western politicians declined by 5-10%, with the only exception (surprisingly) for Emmanuel Macron whose rating increased from 54 to 58%. The heaviest loses where recorded in Ukrainians’ attitudes to Olaf Scholz (the level of trust declined from 61 to 37%) and Joseph Biden (from 82 to 55%). The trust in Trump, though still quite modest (at 45%), might be considered as the flip side of disappointment in Biden who, in Ukrainians’ view, was too cautious in observing Putin’s “red lines” and too slow in delivering crucial military aid. Or, as the director of the Ukrainian New Europe Center Alyona Getmanchuk harshly put it, “Biden was killing Ukraine softly; his policies [of supporting the country ‘as long as it takes’] led to Ukraine’s slow, suffocating defeat”.
In other words, Ukrainians’ optimism about Trump is not based on confidence but rather on fatigue and despair caused by his predecessors, – one may call it “optimism by default,” betting on the last chance. The overwhelming majority of Ukrainians (55%, the highest figure among the other international respondents) are in fact undecided: they cannot clearly answer whether Trump’s presidency as a good or bad thing for their country.
Ukrainian politicians feel probably the same uncertainty, even though they try to put on a brave face at a bad game and secure the country from Trump’s erratic behavior and unpredictability. Their timid optimism seems to stem from the questionable belief that Trump’s recklessness and disrespect for rules might be the best response to Putin’s similar features, who loves to turn out the chessboard at any suitable moment and employs the shameless chutzpah as a major tool and principle of international politics. Fighting fire with fire and great arrogance with even greater arrogance might be a risky experiment but Ukrainians have little choice: they must adopt to the precarious situation.
Despite their mixed experience with Donald Trump and justifiable bias, they make recurrent overtures to him, starting immediately after Trump’s victory last November when Zelensky presumed that the war “will [probably] end faster with the policy of this team that will now lead the White House,” and concluding with the latest comments by Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha (“We view the change of power in the U.S. as a new opportunity and an additional chance. I believe we can expect greater decisiveness from the U.S.”). In a recent interview with the U.S. podcaster Lex Fridman, Volodymyr Zelensky did not spare his compliments for Donald Trump and some of his allies, including the notorious Elon Musk who used to make arrogant statements on both Ukraine and Zelensky himself. “I respect him,” Zelensky said. “First of all, I respect self-made people, I love such people. Nothing has fallen from the sky, the person has done something themselves. I worked myself, I know what it means to earn money, to select talented people, and to do something important… We are very grateful [to Musk] for Starlinks, they helped us. We used them after the Russian strikes, missiles on the energy sector, and problems with the Internet. We used Starlinks at the front, in kindergartens, schools, and in various infrastructure. It helped us a lot.”
In the same conversation, Zelensky emphatically contrasted the leadership skills of Trump and Putin. He praised the former for his care for American people and blamed the latter for sending Russians as cannon fodder to Ukraine to promote his paranoid ideas. Zelensky, indeed, has very good speechwriters and seems to be himself quite a good psychologist who perfectly understands that the best way to evoke somebody’s solidarity is to help them identify themselves with the group in need: “President Trump will be in the same situation as I was in in 2019 – precisely the same situation. I wanted to end the war, and we wanted lasting peace for Ukraine. We had to do this. The ceasefire, exchange people, and then diplomatically return all territories, and we would do this through diplomacy. I wanted to end the war, and we wanted lasting peace for Ukraine”. But – “what will happen next with President Trump? If the ceasefire happens without security guarantees, at least for the territory we control, what does he get? If he manages to make a ceasefire deal and three months later Putin launches a new wave of attacks, what will Trump look like? What will Ukraine look like?”
Security guarantees are Ukraine’s major concern. During his visit to Brussels last month, Volodymyr Zelensky reportedly negotiated with partners “Trump-proof” measures that would mitigate the risks of his forthcoming return to power. Any truce (or “freeze” of the war), he said, would be extremely dangerous unless accompanied by effective security guarantees. But this is the biggest challenge for Ukraine’s Western partners. Whereas they consensually agree that “peace through strength” requires much higher military support for Ukraine in order to bring Russia to the negotiating table, the next step – enforcement of the achieved agreements and protection of Ukraine from Russia’s very probable new invasions – remains a hot potato that nobody wants responsibility for. “Without robust guarantees,” Zelensky maintains, “Putin would use any truce to build his forces back up and launch another attack.”
Three years ago, Putin started the largest war in Europe since 1945, just because he confused the reality on the ground with the virtual reality of his imperial imagination. Donald Trump may commit a similar mistake, trying to end the war in 24 hours or 24 days, while confusing imaginary Ukraine (and imaginary Russia) with a crude and unmalleable reality. So far, he seems to recognize, at least partially, that the reality is more complex, and has extended the time-frame of his political exorcism from 24 hours to 100 days. Further extensions, however, will be inevitable, in all likelihood.
In a recently published discerning article “Why Ukraine Shouldn’t Negotiate with Putin” Robert Person envisions four broad scenarios of a political-diplomatic settlement of the war. The first scenario – of complete Western withdrawal, envisions Ukraine’s crushing defeat that “would be a disaster for U.S. interests, European security, and international stability.” The second scenario – “of a prolonged war of attrition that Ukraine loses” – boils downs essentially to the first scenario, though extended in time. The third scenario – and the “second best” possible option – means that “the West sends enough help that Ukraine can defend itself while making Russia’s long-run costs unbearable.” And the fourth scenario (the “first best,” but hardly achievable) means that “the West does whatever it takes to win.”
Nothing is predetermined, and Ukrainians can certainly implement both the “second best” and the “first best” scenario if they get proper international support. But two other scenarios still loom large, evoking a gloomy memory of Munich in 1938, of Yalta in 1945, and of many more cases when ‘non-historical’ nations were sacrificed for the sake of perfidious Realpolitik. One may only hope that there are some advisers in Donald Trump’s team who are capable of explaining to him the danger of simple solutions and draft a realistic road map toward viable peace. However tempting it may be to exclude the issue of justice from geopolitical calculations and pretend that only big powers are real players and decision-makers, the truth is that ‘non-historical’ nations usually have their own agency, their dignity and identity, and continue to defend them in spite of the obvious and unsurmountable.
Mykola Ryabchuk is a research director at the Institute of Political and Nationality Studies of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and a lecturer at the University of Warsaw. He has written extensively on civil society, nation-state building, national identity, and post-communist transition. One of his books has been translated into French: De la 'Petite-Russie' à l'Ukraine, published in Paris by L'Harmattan in 2003.
