This text is an expanded version of the presentation at the symposium “China-Russia: Affinities and Differences” (Sorbonne, May 10, 2024), in the roundtable “Stability and Fragility Factors of the Two Regimes.” Françoise Thom provides a masterful description of the current state of the Russian regime, its strengths and weaknesses, complementing the presentation by sinologist Jean-Philippe Béja on the strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese regime.
The Strengths of the Putin Regime
From the outside, the Putin regime appears solid and unshakably stable: the country is subdued and passive, the parliament serves as a rubber stamp, and propaganda is in full force. The president has the entire arsenal of the ex-KGB’s methods at his disposal to eradicate opponents and, crucially, to prevent any independent, organized force from crystallizing outside the regime. This structure is further reinforced by “capitalist” tools. Corruption is the glue of the vertical of power. Putin promotes only those over whom he has a thick kompromat file. Debt serves to control Russians as effectively as former communist methods — many Russians have enlisted in the army to pay off a mortgage. Manipulating and monitoring social networks has significantly improved the regime’s ideological control over Russians. Putin can mobilize the country’s financial resources at will, imposing levies on business leaders and the general population.
Putin’s power is sustained by its de-institutionalization: propaganda has successfully convinced Russians that if Putin disappears, Russia itself will cease to exist. Fear of the void is the regime’s most unshakable foundation. Furthermore, the flip side of the Russians’ collective inertia is a rare resourcefulness, inherited from the Soviet era, which partly explains the slow impact of sanctions and the regime’s stability to date.
In terms of foreign policy, the regime benefits from continuity, giving it a considerable advantage over democracies. Since the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact, the Kremlin’s foreign policy has pursued the same objective: hegemony in Europe.
For now, the war has not shaken the Putin state, contrary to what the West expected. Since the botched mobilization of Fall 2022, a kind of top-down revolution has taken place. Russia, which throughout its history has treated its soldiers as cannon fodder — both inexhaustible and nearly free — is now forced to pay its soldiers, and to pay them handsomely. Russian expert Vladislav Inozemtsev speaks of a genuine “economy of death”: “If we work out the total earnings for a 35-year-old man killed on the front after a year, and his family receives all the death bonuses, in 60 Russian regions, his family receives more money than he could have earned by working until retirement. In other words, […] going to the front and being killed a year later is more profitable than working honestly for several decades.” Regions are one after another increasing the bonuses for signing an army contract (indicating that recruits are not flocking to enlistment offices). In some regions, they have even launched a “Refer a Friend” program offering 100,000 rubles to anyone who convinces a relative or friend to enlist.
This “economy of death” has led to a massive redistribution of wealth in Russia, with the very poor regions benefiting. Thus, the regime acquires a new social base (it is estimated that 15% of Russians have become wealthier and continue to profit from the war). The military has also found numerous opportunities for personal gain. Officers, for example, are engaged in lucrative racketeering, demanding bribes of 40,000 to 70,000 rubles to exempt soldiers from being assigned to human wave assaults from which there is no return. Putin has declared his intention to recruit a new elite from among the veterans of the war in Ukraine. This “cultural revolution”-style policy allows him to crush the middle classes and decrease the power of the top oligarchs, who are forced to contribute financially to support these generous handouts for the most backward strata of the Russian Federation. More importantly, it allows him to discipline the existing elites who might be tempted to hold him responsible for his policy failures. As for Russian bureaucracy, it may be a poor administrator, incapable of positive initiatives and helpless at improvisation, but it is a genius at surviving, which is also its strength. We see United Russia notables rushing to the front as soon as they feel they are in the crosshairs of their superiors for corruption. They spend a few months at the rear, in a quiet sector of the front, get filmed in uniform with a martial look, and return home with the prestigious new status of SVO (“special military operation”) veteran, which makes them untouchable.
Weaknesses
This seemingly hyper-efficient system has vulnerabilities. The lack of legitimacy is reflected in the absence of a mechanism for power transition, inevitably leading to infighting within Kremlin circles. The increasing isolation of the leader, surrounded by flatterers, encourages him to make poor decisions based on information tailored to his preferences. People’s inertia and deep disengagement hinders the ambitions of the “national leader.” As evidenced by videos circulating on Telegram channels, Russians observe the war and even the bombings on Russian soil like a fireworks display, admiring the effects, essentially as a spectacle that does not concern them. A cushion of indifference isolates them from everything happening in the country. But Russians know how to shield themselves from state encroachments. They present the barrier of passivity, as was the case during the major vaccination campaigns during the Covid-19 pandemic, so that the often absurd decisions from above are tempered by the masses’ inertia. Today, despite pressure from the government, women remain steadfast in not having more children. Thus, the system contains a mechanism for non-institutional self-correction. Putin also knows that Russians will do nothing to come to his aid if his power falters. This was evident during Prigozhin’s escapade. The vertical of power is made up of opportunists ready to switch sides at the first opportunity. This is why the dictator is always on the alert. His nervousness was apparent during the recent municipal and regional elections: no “systemic liberal” or communist was allowed to run. Clearly, the authorities fear that even controlled opposition could become dangerous in a crisis, representing a rallying point the day the system begins to waver, as happened in East Germany in the Spring of 1990 with the puppet parties, which had until then been docile allies of the Socialist Unity Party.
For years, Putin has pursued the utopia of self-sufficiency. “Self-sufficiency” and “import substitution” have been popular slogans since the annexation of Crimea. Once again, Russia is a victim of boomerang effects. Kremlin leaders may praise Russian sovereignty, but the country has become even more dependent on foreign nations than before, and Russians are well aware of this. Russia is now at the mercy of China, which takes advantage of the lack of competition to raise prices and demand extravagant discounts.
Meanwhile, the war is becoming increasingly expensive as Soviet-era weapon stockpiles are depleted. Estimates of the war’s cost range from over $300m to $900m per day (Newsweek, May 6, 2024). Arms spending has increased by 126% compared with 2022. Reserves accumulated during prosperous years are being exhausted. The Russian government has been reduced to squeezing its own population. It recently introduced a progressive income tax. VAT continues to rise. New levies are mushrooming: divorce taxes, tourism taxes, and so on. The labor shortage is driving up wages, fueling inflation, another potentially destabilizing factor for the Russian regime. Increasingly, demand exceeds supply. The bonus for signing a contract with the Ministry of Defense has risen from 200,000 rubles in 2022 to 3 million rubles today. Imports have decreased by 10% in 2024. The Russian Central Bank has just raised the key interest rate to 19%. Chinese banks are refusing to process transactions with their Russian clients in rubles or yuan held by Russia. Russian importers are forced to pay their Chinese suppliers by transferring gold to Dubai, and from there to Singapore, where it is converted into “clean” yuan.
The labor shortage is becoming dire. A million IT positions are unfilled, and 1.6m positions are unfilled in the military-industrial complex, despite recruiting 520,000 employees over the past two years. There is a shortage of 152,000 police officers and 92,000 doctors and medical personnel. The Academy of Sciences estimates that the economy needs an additional 4.8 million workers. The front consumes so many men that even defense industry workers are being sent there. The most extraordinary thing is that Putin continues to loudly announce grandiose projects: for example, the construction of Sputnik, a new city in the Far East near Vladivostok, with an estimated cost of 900bn rubles.
The war has also starkly highlighted the disparity between cities — Moscow and Saint Petersburg — and the provinces, particularly Russia’s non-Russian regions — Yakutia, the Republic of Tuva, Buryatia — where casualty rates have been the highest in proportion to the population. The Republic of Tuva holds the record for war deaths, with Buryatia second. A Buryat has a 75% higher chance of dying in Ukraine than a Russian from Moscow. Yakutia has lost so many young men sent to the front that it will face a labor shortage this Winter. Ethnic tensions are simmering. After a brawl between Russians and Chechens in Anapa, Commander Apti Alaudinov, head of the Akhmat battalion and Kadyrov’s presumed successor, sharply accused the Russian authorities of bias: “We are made to feel that we are not citizens of the Russian Federation, that we are second-class citizens, meant to stay at home. I am horrified to see that lately divisions are being stoked between the peoples of Russia. Various groups are forming, under the patronage of high-ranking comrades, special services, calling for war against the Caucasus. What grievances do you hold against us? The worst part is that it’s government bodies carrying out this work to undermine Russia […]. We have the right to die at the front, but our forces are insulted with impunity: no one has ever been prosecuted for that […]. We fight for you, and you don’t even consider us human.” Alaudinov’s remarks sparked an outcry among Z-bloggers. Ivan Ostrakovski, a Russian army officer, expressed indignation at the impunity enjoyed by Chechens who see themselves as “a chosen people”: “We’re tired of being trampled on, insulted, spat upon, and forced to apologize because we are Russian. But our day will come.” In the event of an ethnic conflict in Russia, the Akhmat battalion could very well side with the Islamists, Ostrakovski added.
These tensions are exacerbated by Russia’s demographic collapse. Official statistics record a population decline for the ninth consecutive year. In 2021, due to the Covid-19 pandemic, Russia lost 1.04m people, a record. The process of depopulation in Russia has accelerated since the war in Ukraine: in the first half of 2024, the population decline amounted to 321,500 people, compared with 272,500 last year, an increase of 40,000 over 2023. In July 2024, the mortality rate exceeded that of July 2023 by 20%. Mortality rates are rising (by 60,000 per year), and life expectancy is stagnating or even declining. From January to June 2024, 599,600 children were born in Russia, 16,000 fewer than during the same period in 2023. Six years ago, a state official from Putin’s administration told a mother seeking assistance, “The state didn’t ask you to give birth.” Now, however, Russian women are being ordered to “return to traditional values” and have eight children like their grandmothers. The authorities lament the “selfishness” of young Russians, who think only of studying and having fun rather than ensuring future generations of soldiers. But the young pay no heed.
This demographic decline makes immigration a major concern that the authorities exploit to divert attention from failures in Ukraine and economic difficulties. After the March 22, 2024, attack at Crocus City Hall, it appears that the issue of migrants is drawing more public attention than the war in Ukraine. A “Russian March” for victory, bringing together priests, veterans of the war in Ukraine, Wagner mercenaries, bikers, etc., was held in Saint Petersburg on September 12, 2024, under the slogan “We are Russians, God is with us.” It was interpreted as a declaration of war by many Russian Muslims because of a statement by one of the leaders of the “Russian Community,” Andrei Tkachuk, who called on the “march of patriots” to rid Russia of “damned infidel Muslims.”
Russian officials cite the need to “whiten” Russian regions. Yet the number of migrants has plummeted since 2019, when it reached 19m. In 2023, legal migrants numbered around 8m, and in 2024 they are down to just 6.5m. The number of illegal migrants is unknown. Russians fear the violence that will erupt in the country when the war is over, as SVO veterans clash with migrants. “We can already see the conflict coming,” says entrepreneur Dmitri Potapenko. “I am convinced that one of the triggers will be a confrontation, either staged or spontaneous, between heroes of the SVO and migrants. Essentially, a million against 10 million.” Indeed, the proliferation of mercenaries poses a risk to the stability of the system. These men, brought under the flag for hefty sums and treated by most of their officers in the old Soviet manner, like livestock easily replaced, have accumulated explosive resentment. Then, one day, the former mercenary finds himself back in civilian life, theoretically privileged but despised and feared by those at home. How will he accept returning to a salary of 20,000 rubles when he used to receive 200,000?
The campaign against migrants is organized by the siloviki with complicity from the authorities. It is easy to see why they are so insistent on persuading the Duma and regional officials to increase restrictions, particularly in employment, that affect migrants: this creates lucrative racketeering under the guise of patriotic zeal. Alexander Bastrykin, head of the Investigative Committee, exclaimed, “While our men are fighting on the front, migrants are sowing chaos at home.” Mass immigration is a threat to national security, declare the siloviki. Kirill Kabanov, a member of the Human Rights Council under the President of the Russian Federation, publicly stated that the presence of a large Muslim population in Russia is leading to the “halalization of the economy.” Serious crimes committed by migrants increased by 32% in 2023. Islamic banks have opened in Tatarstan. Migrant enclaves populated by people from Central Asia are multiplying in the heart of Russia. There are hundreds of clandestine mosques in Moscow and the Moscow region. Radicals expelled by Central Asian republic authorities find refuge in Russia. Russian nationalists are concerned: diasporas are allegedly infiltrating local administrations. A Russian citizen originally from Uzbekistan, Bakhromjon Khasanov, who was elected as a councilor in the city of Pushkino on the United Russia ticket, was forced to resign four days after his victory. Russian nationalists envy the way diasporas are organized in Russia. The blogger Alexandra Matveichuk, an avowed nationalist, explains the rise of communalism in Russia: “When people see the madhouse that is our country, when they listen to the news, they think: nothing works in this country, no one will help you, no one will protect you, and the law is applied selectively. So, they turn to groups, thinking: I’d better join the Muslims, join the Tatar diaspora, etc.” Thus, the atomization of citizens encouraged by the authorities ultimately fosters the explosion of cultural isolationism.
The ruling circle is visibly divided on the issue of immigration, and these divisions came to the surface regarding family reunification. Dmitry Medvedev stated that it is intolerable that three-quarters of children in some classrooms do not understand Russian, and recommended banning family reunification, with immediate support from Vyacheslav Volodin, the Speaker of the Duma. Conversely, Valentina Matviyenko, Speaker of the Federation Council, believes in fostering “friendship among peoples” in the Soviet way.
Russian leaders have opened a Pandora’s box by attacking Ukraine. A growing number of Russians are resentful toward President Putin, as he seems to support the “great replacement” (a term now used in Russia), sending Russians to die in his large-scale offensives along the Ukrainian front, while he recently declared, “We are not against an increase in the Muslim population; on the contrary, we welcome it. Our Muslim republics have a very good birth rate, and we are pleased with this.” Putin’s anti-West obsession and the ensuing policy of ingratiating himself with the “Global South” are now backfiring in Russia and contributing to the destabilization of the regime. The discourse on “traditional values” hinders any progress toward the assimilation of migrants. While patriots loudly denounce the rapid Islamization of Russia, during his visit to Chechnya in August, Putin kissed the Quran, which he presented as a gift to the Prophet Isa Mosque. “The entire Muslim world is proud of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s attitude toward the Quran, believers, and Islam. This is the opposite of the actions of Western European leaders, who encourage the rejection of religion and promote an immoral ideology, satanism,” commented Akhmed Dudaev, a Chechen minister. The video of this scene was widely circulated in Russia.
In a similar vein, in early September, Putin stated that the younger generation in his family was fluent in Chinese — a remark that, unsurprisingly, did not go unnoticed in Russia, where the policy of subservience to China is viewed poorly by public opinion, including among military bloggers. Nationalist blogger Dmitry Dyomushkin has sharply criticized President Putin’s cherished “pivot to China”: “Many of our strategists dream of going to war against the cursed West alongside China […]. I do not share these illusions at all. We will more likely have to go to war against China, and the West will more likely fight for us if we get swallowed up by China […]. We are infinitely distant from China; we have nothing in common with this country — in terms of mentality, it’s another planet. Russians know everything about the rotten West. Our youth feeds on Western music, Hollywood, kids play Spiderman games, whereas no one knows anything about China.” China’s economic power depends on the West, and China will never sacrifice this relationship for the tiny market that Russia represents: “Economically, we are not even a younger brother to China but an infant in a nursery. […] The Chinese have no illusions about us […]. The Chinese have pushed us out of Africa and Central Asia. They invest a hundred times more in Central Asia. […] I think the West will never take over Russia, but China very well could.” An article by Viktor Biryukov published in Voyennoe Obozrenie, a magazine close to the Ministry of Defense, accused China of conforming to Western sanctions despite its declarations of friendship with Moscow and concluded that “there is no such thing as friendship between the Russian Federation and the PRC,” given that “historically, China has never been an ally of Russia.” Even Boris Nadezhdin, the “systemic liberal” who wanted to run against Putin in the presidential elections, strongly condemned the “pivot to China”: “I don’t understand how we decided to orient ourselves toward China.” “The Chinese have absolutely no concept of helping a friend. They think like this: you are weak, so we can exploit you to make money.”
Finally, the Putin regime will have to learn that while it may be easy to neutralize human opposition, it is impossible to curb the resistance of things. The deterioration of infrastructure is becoming glaringly apparent. Last Winter, many towns found themselves without heating. This past July, 600,000 residents in southern Russia were left without power (and thus without running water) for weeks in temperatures reaching 50°C (122°F). Around 70,000 elevators are obsolete. Planes and helicopters are falling from the sky, massive traffic jams paralyze the Trans-Siberian Railway, whose average speed has dropped to 40 km/h (24.8 mph). The power grid has no reserves left. Maintenance of power plants is neglected due to lack of funding and technicians. Fires are left unattended due to a shortage of firefighters, incidents on gas and oil pipelines occur daily, and Gazprom is in deficit. Dams and bridges are collapsing, trains are derailing, and trash is piling up in towns due to a lack of sanitation workers. Economist Igor Lipsitz predicts that the regime will eventually be overwhelmed by a chain reaction of infrastructure failures — dam collapses, power plant breakdowns, railway paralysis, leaking pipes, etc — that will plunge millions of Russians into blackouts in the depths of Winter.
Thus, the war in Ukraine, launched by Putin in a bid to strengthen his despotism, is corroding the decayed edifice of Russian power from all sides. The violence exported to Ukraine is returning to Russia, magnified by years of brutalization in the trenches. The vertical of power, increasingly tyrannical, appears ever more precariously layered over an underlying chaos that is rising inexorably. The incompetence of the ruling circle surrounding Putin is becoming glaringly obvious.
All of this explains why Putin is so desperate to annex Ukraine, throwing all his resources into this final effort. A victory in Ukraine would save and extend his regime, just as the 1945 victory saved Stalin’s. Westerners should bear this precedent in mind when they push Ukrainians to resign themselves to the loss of their territories. It is crucial to prevent Putin from strutting as a victor and posing as the “unifier of Russian lands.” It must be understood that Putin will never be satisfied with annexing the eastern provinces. He wants all of Ukraine, and the Russian army certainly has a team of collaborators ready to take power, modeled after oligarch Ivanishvili in Georgia, who, like Marshal Pétain, portrays himself as Georgians’ “shield” against a Russia supposedly poised to bomb Tbilisi if the National Party won the majority. For Putin, it is important that Westerners take the initiative in amputating Ukraine’s territory, in order to permanently discredit the pro-West party in Kyiv. Russian propaganda will then easily persuade demoralized Ukrainians that they have constantly been betrayed by the West.
The Kremlin sees Ukraine as a springboard into Europe. Z-bloggers repeat it constantly: reunited with Ukraine, Russia will possess the two most battle-hardened armies in Europe and be in a position to subjugate European nations, harnessing them to its sphere of influence. Thus, logistical issues will be resolved by extorting a terrified Europe, weakened by the rise of pro-Russia collaborationist parties. Western advocates of Ukraine’s partition cite the example of the FRG, created in 1949, amputated of the Eastern Länder occupied by the Red Army. But let us not forget that the FRG was able to survive and prosper thanks to the presence of the three Western powers, which thwarted Stalin’s subversive maneuvers, including his flirtation with German nationalism and his attempts to infiltrate all major FRG parties. For free Ukraine to survive, it must not settle for vague security guarantees. It has the right to demand a Western military presence and the continuation of sanctions until Russia withdraws from the occupied territories. We have seen that Russia is entering a zone of turbulence. It tries to hide it, but it is in dire straits. Let us not allow it to pose as a victorious power dictating its own terms of peace.
She has a degree in classical literature and spent 4 years in the USSR from 1973 to 1978. She is an agrégée in Russian and teaches Soviet history and international relations at Paris Sorbonne.
