Vladimir Putin’s visit to Mongolia on September 2 and 3, an independent country, unlike “Inner Mongolia,” which is occupied by Communist China, briefly drew attention to the “nation of the steppes.” Otherwise, it was mostly noted with regret that Mongolia, the first country to sign the Rome Statute — which established the International Criminal Court (ICC) — was hosting the Kremlin’s leader, who is under an international arrest warrant. In effect, Mongolia’s latitude for action is limited, and Western powers lack leverage.
A vast country three times the size of France (1.5 million square kilometers with 3.5 million inhabitants), Mongolia remains a landlocked territory, bordered by Russia to the north and the People’s Republic of China to the south. When Mongolia took advantage of the collapse of imperial China into disorder and war after the 1911 revolution to declare its independence, its leaders turned to Tsarist Russia, viewed as an ally and protector. During the Russian Civil War that followed the Bolshevik coup (the October Revolution, in November 1917), Chinese troops once again occupying Mongolia were expelled by a counter-revolutionary general, the infamous Baron Ungern-Sternberg1. He was later ousted by the Bolsheviks, who were allied with Mongolian nationalists, with the latter taking control of the country. In 1924, after the death of the Bogd Khan (the spiritual leader of the Mongols), Mongolian leaders decided to adopt the Soviet development model. The alliance between Mongolia and the USSR became explicit and persisted until 1990. During this period, Soviet political and economic support was massive, with Mongolia later joining COMECON in 1962. As early as 1936, Moscow explicitly declared that the USSR would defend Mongolia’s independence and sovereignty against any potential Chinese attack.
Russia’s Continued Presence
The weakening of ties with Russia began in 1990. Despite the friendship and cooperation treaty signed by Moscow and Ulaanbaatar, post-Soviet Russia in the decade following the collapse of the USSR (1991) lacked the means to pursue an active policy in Mongolia. Mongolian leaders initiated a policy known as the “third neighbor” strategy, which involved maintaining cordial relations with both Beijing and Moscow while developing relations with third parties (the “third neighbor”): other Asian countries (Japan, South Korea, and India, seen as a “spiritual neighbor”), European partners (France, Germany), and especially the United States, which is viewed as the primary “third neighbor” capable of counterbalancing relations with Russia and the People’s Republic of China. In this overall setting, Russia is more of a partner and balancing factor than an ally strictly speaking. Nevertheless, a “strategic partnership” was signed in 2009, and Russian and Mongolian military forces regularly conduct joint exercises (the “Darkhan” exercises from 2008 to 2010 and “Selenga” since 2011), particularly in the Gobi Desert. Additionally, major Russian corporations are heavily involved in Mongolia’s mining sector (gold, silver, copper, uranium), energy supplies (oil), and large transportation projects (such as the railway link between Mongolia and the Pacific coast).
Mongolia’s other major neighbor and partner is the People’s Republic of China, which is as active in High Asia as it is in former Western Turkestan (post-Soviet Central Asia). Broadly speaking, Mongolia imports Russian oil for its own needs and exports its coal, extracted from significant mines, to China, except for the coal used domestically to produce electricity (Mongolia generates 80% of its electricity, with the remainder imported from Russia). Only the diplomatic weight of Beijing and the importance of Chinese economic interests, supplemented by bilateral military exercises2, allow the Mongolian government to offer some resistance to Russian pressure. This is why the coalition formed around the Mongolian People’s Party following the June 2024 legislative elections did not include in its program the Russian gas pipeline project that would pass through Mongolia to deliver Siberian gas to the Chinese market (the “Power of Siberia 2” project). Such audacity from Ulaanbaatar can be explained by the fact that Sino-Russian negotiations have not yet concluded (this should not be seen as a point of rupture between Beijing and Moscow).
Western powers, specifically the United States and France, are striving to play the role of a third force, thus responding to Mongolia’s “third neighbor” diplomacy. In fact, the interest in Mongolia—a vast treasure chest with immense natural resources (notably rare metals, which are essential for new technologies)—is not new. In a completely different context, we remember the final stop in Mongolia George W. Bush made on November 21, 2005, during an Asian tour that first took the U.S. President to Japan, South Korea, and Communist China. This visit was a gesture of gratitude to Mongolia for its involvement in Iraq, where around 100 Mongolian soldiers were participating in military operations. Today, the idea is to exploit the regional and global geopolitical reconfiguration, accelerated by the launch of the Russian “special military operation” on February 24, 2022, and the shift to a high-intensity conflict (the “war in Ukraine”). The new Cold War between the Sino-Russian axis and the West is partly being played out on the diplomatic front, reaching deep into the Eurasian steppes.
Mongolia’s Quest for a “Third Neighbor”
Thus, Emmanuel Macron, returning from the G7 in Hiroshima, became the first French president to set foot on Mongolian soil (May 21, 2023). As in the Caucasus and Turkestan, the objective, according to French officials, was to “loosen the constraints exerted on Russia’s neighbors and expand their range of options.” In October of the same year, Mongolian President Ukhnaagiin Khürelsükh was welcomed at the Élysée palace, an occasion (so to speak) for the French company Orano, formerly Areva, to sign a memorandum of understanding for a uranium mining project at Zuuvch Ovoo in southwestern Mongolia. As for American diplomacy, it continues to expand its sphere of influence far beyond maritime Asia (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Southeast Asia), reaching all the way to Mongolia. At the end of an Asian tour (Laos, Vietnam, Japan, the Philippines, Singapore) aimed more at Beijing than Moscow, Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited Ulaanbaatar to reaffirm the American vision for the Indo-Pacific region and its Eurasian hinterland: “We are focused on a shared positive vision for the region, not against China but about the many countries with which we work who share that vision […] for a free and prosperous Indo-Pacific region” (Ulaanbaatar, August 1, 2024). In his remarks, the U.S. Secretary of State positioned Mongolia as a “central partner” with whom a “strategic dialogue” needs to be established3.
For analytical purposes, if we set aside the presence and influence of Communist China on Mongolia’s future, it would be a mistake to assume that Russia, facing Chinese and Western interests, is doomed to fade away. Vladimir Putin and his associates, in High Asia as in other theaters, are not engaged in a “strategic competition” logic, however harsh, but one that is limited in the use of means. It is an open and deliberate confrontation, as evidenced by the Kremlin’s diatribes against the “collective West” and the millenarian dimension of its official geopolitical discourse. While the U.S. or France may attempt to woo Mongolian leaders with attractive offers, Russian leaders do not hesitate to wield their power of disruption and coercion. Last winter, which was particularly harsh for Mongolian herders and their livestock, unfortunate “technical problems” and delays in Russian deliveries forced several Mongolian provinces to limit electricity usage (resulting in recurring power outages) and halt fuel distribution.
These constraints and relentless pressures weigh heavily on Mongolian diplomacy, which has taken care not to vote in favor of UN General Assembly resolutions condemning Russia’s military aggression in Ukraine (Mongolia abstained). However, it seems clear that the breakthrough of French company Orano deeply displeased the Kremlin, which exacted a price from the Mongolian population. Not to mention the American overtures to the “nation of the steppes,” viewed by Moscow and Beijing as challenging their condominium over High Asia. It is very likely that the guarantee of regular Russian oil deliveries will come with strings attached: at a minimum, slowing down the rapprochement with Western powers and maintaining a benevolent form of neutrality in the war in Ukraine. It is also possible that the memorandum of understanding signed with Orano will be called into question, with Russia promising to invest in Mongolia’s thermal power plants (and there is also talk of building a Russian nuclear power plant).
To Conclude
Given Mongolia’s geopolitical situation and the heavy constraints it faces, the impunity granted to Vladimir Putin during his visit to Ulaanbaatar — under the pretext of commemorating the Soviet victory over the Japanese army at the Battle of Khalkhin Gol (May-September 1939) — is not surprising. While it is perfectly legitimate to remind the Mongolian government of the obligations it freely undertook by signing the Rome Statute (which established the ICC), it would be unwise to adopt a stance of “hyper-morality” (as Arnold Gehlen put it) and attempt to intimidate Ulaanbaatar. In fact, Western diplomatic missions have been rather discreet.
This is primarily about power dynamics, access, and leverage in a region where Western powers have no operating bases or strongholds from which their diplomacy could deeply influence the course of events. Such a conclusion does not imply giving up on action, but diplomatic and strategic objectives must be carefully identified, delimited, and circumscribed. In short, so far from their bases, “strategic patience” is required. On the other hand, a more resolute Western policy in other geopolitical theaters — from Ukraine to Turkestan, including the Caucasus, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific — would yield positive effects even in the depths of Eurasia.
Associate professor of history and geography and researcher at the French Institute of Geopolitics (University of Paris VIII). Author of several books, he works within the Thomas More Institute on geopolitical and defense issues in Europe. His research areas cover the Baltic-Black Sea region, post-Soviet Eurasia, and the Mediterranean.
Footnotes
- The character appears in Hugo Pratt’s Corto Maltese in Siberia. He is also a key figure in Viktor Pelevin’s Clay Machine Gun, Seuil, 1997.
- See most recently the exercise “Border Defense Cooperation 2023” (November 2023).
- Mongolia’s Foreign Minister, Batmunkh Battsetseg, was in Washington the previous week to meet with Mr. Blinken and initiate this “strategic dialogue.”
