On Remote Hopes and Near Challenges
As the American Congress finally approved the much-awaited and long-delayed aid package for Kyiv, many Ukrainians breathed a sigh of relief, though probably prematurely. However important money may be, it would not make the war by itself. Weeks if not months are needed to obtain the required weapons, to deliver them to frontlines, and to teach the newly mobilized soldiers how to use them. There are too many challenges at each stage, so radical changes in the course of the war are very unlikely for the next few months. Ukrainians are still in retreat, while Russians increase the pressure, trying to use this window of opportunity to their advantage.
Lack of munition is apparently Ukraine’s biggest problem: the thousand or two thousand shells they can afford daily is a small fraction (one fifth or even one tenth, reportedly) of what their adversaries fire on them every day. Likewise, a few dozen old-style Soviet aircraft is a poor match for hundreds of modernized Russian MIGs and SUs; and the shady drones that Ukrainians use to target military objects on Russian territory can hardly compete with ballistic missiles that Russia uses against all kinds of Ukrainian objects all over the country. The struggle largely resembles the fight between a light-weight boxer with a heavy-weighter, where the former is additionally handicapped with one hand tied.
War of attrition is predictably more advantageous for a more populous and resourceful country. “While the fat one loses weight,” a popular Ukrainian proverb says, “the thin one will die.” In the short run, Russia as an autocracy has more advantages not only vis-à-vis Ukraine, but also against Western democracies, concerned with the electorate, immersed in parliamentary debates, and struggling with complex legal rules and procedures. No such problems in Putin’s perfect dictatorship. The opposition is fully suppressed, public opinion manipulated, and the entire economy is thoroughly geared up for the protracted war.
The only advantage Ukrainians have in this uphill battle is their commitment — their civic morale and patriotic mobilization. But it also has its limits. At least 100,000 Ukrainians have been killed since the beginning of the war and a few hundred thousand wounded. Many of those who perished were the bravest people that volunteered on the first days of the war — the most dedicated and self-sacrificing members of the armed forces. The days are gone when tvolunteers at conscription centers were turned down because their number exceeded the centers’ capacity to equip them. The appetite for the fight has declined notably, and draft-dodging become quite a widespread phenomenon. The governments’ failure to timely address the problem, to pass much-needed laws through the parliament, and to communicate effectively the issue through the mass media, only contributed to the general bewilderment and distress.
Ukrainians still donate huge sums of money for various military needs, and engage actively in civic initiatives to prop up the war efforts; the overwhelming majority still supports the idea of fighting until all the territory of Ukraine and its inhabitants are liberated, and rejects angrily any suggestion of a possible concession to the aggressor. But fewer and fewer are willing to put their own lives at risk for those decent and broadly coveted goals. One may call this stance cynical or just human but, in any case, it is understandable — to feel some fatigue in the third hear of the exhausting war that has brought incredible loss and suffering to the people, and no prospects, so far, for an end in the foreseeable future.
Mismanagement of rotation and recuperation of troops, as well as residual corruption in various fields and at different levels — despite all the government’s and watchdogs’ efforts to curb and uproot it — also contributes to popular cynicism and ambiguity. Ukraine is certainly not as corrupt as it used to be, but the war has highly increased public demand for justice and fairness, making the issue extremely sensitive and the reaction to it extremely hot. Ukrainians undoubtedly benefit from independent mass media but freedom of speech also requires particular communication skills from authorities that are not always at the war-time level they are supposed to be. As a result, popular trust in state institutions has fallen down to nearly pre-war level, though with a few important exceptions: Ukrainian armed forces, the security apparatus and emergency services still enjoy overwhelming support from the population (over 90% in opinion surveys), and positive attitudes still prevail in the country toward the president, independent mass media and, remarkably, local authorities.
War fatigue, though conspicuous and probably unavoidable after two years of daily deaths and dreadful destruction, has not yet translated into any kind of despair and defeatism. Some 89% of respondents in a nationwide survey are confident that Ukraine will ultimately win the war (down from 95% in 2022), 73% contend they are ready to endure the war as long as it will take (up from 71% in 2002), and 66% understand Ukraine’s victory as the full liberation of all the territories illegally occupied by Russia (down from 71% in 2022). What has notably changed within the past two years is Ukrainians’ attitude toward the so-called diplomatic solution. Back in May 2022, 59% of respondents agreed that “in addition to the military, Ukraine should also look for a diplomatic way to end the war with Russia in order to minimize human casualties,” while 35% believed that “Ukraine can defeat Russia only by military means, regardless of the number of victims.” Today, the latter view is supported only by 23% of respondents, while as many as 72% consider the diplomatic way as desirable — though not instead of the military way but in addition to it.
This view has been articulated recently by general Vadym Skibitsky, deputy head of Ukraine’s military intelligence. He recognized that there are many problems on the battlefield and that things are about to get worse, since, on the one hand, the Russian army is not the hubristic organization it was in 2022, but operates now as a “single body, with a clear plan, and under a single command,” while, on the other hand, Ukraine still desperately needs munition, and partners, in many cases, lack the capacity to provide it any time soon (e.g., the whole of the EU produces three times fewer artillery shells than Russia). So, he concludes, there is no way for Ukraine to win the war on the battlefield alone under the circumstances. “Even if it were able to push Russian forces back to the borders — an increasingly distant prospect — this wouldn’t end the war. Such wars can only end with treaties… Right now, both sides are jockeying for the ‘most favorable position’ ahead of potential talks. But meaningful negotiations can begin only in the second half of 2025 at the earliest… Both sides could eventually run out of weapons. But if nothing changes in other respects, Ukraine will run out first.”
His statement seems to contradict the official position of the Ukrainian government and of President Volodymyr Zelensky in particular, since they vehemently deny any possible peace talks with today’s Russian leadership, headed by the Vladimir Putin, who has been accused of war crimes. Mr. Skibitsky is fully aware of this when he contends at the end of his interview: “We will keep fighting. We have no choice. We want to live”. But — he comes back to the miserable reality — “the outcome of the war […] isn’t just down to us.”
Essentially, his position does not differ from that expressed in the opinion survey, quoted above and supported by a majority of respondents in both 2022 and 2024: “In addition to the military, Ukraine should also look for a diplomatic way to end the war with Russia in order to minimize human casualties.” The emphasis here is apparently on “in addition to” and definitely not on “instead of” — since the latter is generally understood as defeat and capitulation — something that Moscow strives for. But what are the military means (and achievements) that would enable/entail diplomatic talks “in addition to” the reality on the ground?
At the moment, it is easier to define what is definitely impossible and unacceptable for both the Ukrainian political class and society at large. They may probably accept the ceasefire and freeze the conflict at the existing frontlines — if reliable security guarantees (not feckless “assurances”) are provided and trusted peacekeeping forces (NATO, UN, etc.) are deployed to protect the armistice. Ukrainians may probably renege on their proclaimed intentions to liberate occupied territories with arms but not cede those territories (and people on them) to Russia by any formal agreement. They would rather insist on a peaceful return of these territories to Ukraine by either the current or, more likely, some future Russian government, and will request international partners not to normalize relations with Russia until the lands are returned, reparations are paid, and war crimes are duly investigated and prosecuted. “In addition,” Ukrainians may probably renounce their coveted NATO membership and accept non-allied status (which they used to have before the Russian invasion in 2014) but, again, reliable security guarantees are needed — and not “assurances” of the kind they received in 1994 in Budapest from the U.S., the UK and, ironically, Russia.
To make all this happen, the Russian authorities should change their mind, or be changed/replaced completely themselves. Either development looks unlikely until and unless Ukrainians facilitate it in the battlefield. Secondly, Western partners should be ready to provide security guarantees (short of a NATO membership but essentially of the same kind), though this might be even more difficult than to change Russians’ mind. In recently leaked documents from the Russian-Ukrainian peace talks held in the early months of 2022 (March-April, in Minsk and Istanbul), many tough questions remained unanswered, and one of them, perhaps the most crucial, was about reliable mediators and guarantors of a sustainable armistice. In spite of the widespread rumors about the alleged “Western pressure” that forced Kyiv to renege on negotiations and opt for war, it was in fact Western reluctance “to be drawn into a negotiation with Russia, particularly one that would have created new commitments for them to ensure Ukraine’s security” — as Samuel Charap, one of the staunchest supporters of “peace talks”, remarkably recognizes.
This means that Ukrainians still have no choice, as Gen. Skibitsky has bitterly put it, but to keep fighting. And to win, they must reframe the fight from a struggle between the “fat” and the “thin” to a struggle between the dumb and the smart, the sluggish and the brisk. As long as a small Soviet army fights the big Soviet army, it has no chance to win. Ukrainians have made some important steps to become non-Soviet, but they must still intensify their efforts to advance.
Mykola Ryabchuk is a research director at the Institute of Political and Nationality Studies of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and a lecturer at the University of Warsaw. He has written extensively on civil society, nation-state building, national identity, and post-communist transition. One of his books has been translated into French: De la 'Petite-Russie' à l'Ukraine, published in Paris by L'Harmattan in 2003.
