Nuclear and Conventional Weapons: Moscow’s Historic Betrayal

While a Russian-drafted “peace plan” is being negotiated between the Americans, Ukrainians, and their European allies, we need to bear in mind that Russia does not respect its international commitments, particularly in the area of nuclear and conventional weapons. Moscow has deliberately dismantled the post-Cold War diplomatic and security architecture as part of a “grand strategy” aimed at dominating Europe. This breach of trust should prevent any complacency toward Russian demands.

Some continue to believe that the Kremlin, once it has pocketed its territorial gains in Ukraine, could be a reliable partner. However, we should not forget that Russia violated the INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty and the CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe) Treaty several years before it took action in Georgia and then Ukraine.

Russia’s violation of the INF Treaty

An effect of a “new détente” and a harbinger of the implosion of the Soviet Union, the INF Treaty, signed by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev on December 8, 1987, decided on the withdrawal and prohibition of all land-based missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometers. A total of 1,846 Soviet and 846 U.S. missiles were eliminated¹. The treaty inaugurated a series of disarmament agreements on strategic nuclear weapons and chemical weapons, supplemented by a treaty on conventional forces in Europe (CFE) and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), notably the Vienna Document. Announced by the United States on February 2, 2019, with Russia following suit, the withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty is not a trivial matter. This “two-pronged decision” is indicative of the strategic and geopolitical challenges Western powers are facing. In this case, Moscow intends to place the blame on the Americans, even though the latter have the support of their allies. In fact, experts on these issues believe that Moscow was indeed in violation of this treaty, which had been nominally challenged since the 2000s (the French hesitated before rallying to the U.S. position). The missile incriminated by the Americans and their allies is the “9M729” (the SSC-8 in NATO nomenclature), with a range well over 500 kilometers (in return, the Russians are questioning NATO’s anti-missile systems).

In truth, this problem dates back to Barack Obama’s first term in office. In 2010, the deployment of the Iskander-M weapons system in the Kaliningrad enclave (formerly Königsberg), with a range exceeding 500 kilometers, was already contentious. The issue was officially raised in 2013, but the Russians did not respond. It escalated with the deployment of the SCC-8 (a system based on Kalibr naval technology) in 2016, near the Caspian Sea and east of the Ural Mountains. This Russian violation is a deliberate decision that constitutes revenge for the 1987 treaty, which was poorly received by the Soviet military nomenklatura and the “security organs” from which most of the Russian ruling class today comes from². However, the stakes are not only psychologic and symbolic or technical and industrial. The deployment of weapons systems of this range poses a threat to politically valuable targets and military INFrastructure of European NATO members. Russia’s withdrawal from the INF Treaty and the deployment of SSC-8 or Kalibr-M cruise missiles is a major challenge. Much more than in the late 1970s, Europe is under threat from one or more selective strikes: a decapitation strategy serving a revisionist geopolitical project (changing borders by force and re-satellizing neighboring countries). The Russians have taken a lead in this category of weapons and are working to rebuild their former military-industrial potential.

The most significant difference with the era of the “Euro-missile battle” lies in the orders of magnitude in terms of power relations. Thus, to understand the U.S.-Russian “two-pronged decision” to withdraw from the INF Treaty, we need to take into account Greater Asia, from the Levant to the Middle East. One thinks of Iran’s ballistic missile program, which is prohibited by a U.N. resolution. In line with Tehran’s ambitions in the Middle East (the “Shiite Crescent”), Iranian missiles have a range of 2,000 kilometers (see, for example, the Khorramshahr); they fall into the category of weapons that Russia and the United States banned themselves from possessing under the 1987 treaty. In addition, the Iranian Shiite regime is pursuing a cruise missile program, the importance of which has been highlighted by events in recent months. Furthermore, the United States fears the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which is not bound by the 1987 treaty: four-fifths of its ballistic arsenal, or about 2,000 missiles, have a range of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. In addition to nuclear deterrence, these missiles serve an anti-access strategy aimed at locking down the “Asian Mediterranean” (the South and East China Seas), i.e., keeping out the Americans in particular and the West in general.

The PRC’s objective is to destroy their regional alliances and, in defiance of international law, to appropriate a maritime area even larger than the Mediterranean Sea (3.5 million sq km compared with 2.5 million sq km), through which a large part of world trade transits. This anti-access strategy, which is part of a policy of intimidation against the United States and its regional allies, is complemented by a quasi-alliance with Russia, which in a sense replicates what the late French Admiral Raoul Castex called “Genghis Khan’s grand maneuver“: securing support in Asia in order to fight in Europe, where Moscow has geopolitical grievances. Finally, it is important to understand the historical significance and global scope of the U.S.-Russian ”dual decision”: it constitutes a new stage in the dismantling of the post-Cold War security architecture. Moscow is attempting to take Europe hostage, a continent that is geostrategically decoupled from the United States.

Non-compliance with the CFE Treaty

The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) was signed in Paris on November 19, 1990, by the member states of the Atlantic Alliance and those of the Warsaw Pact, just over a year before the USSR collapsed (December 21, 1991). The CFE Treaty therefore binds thirty states. According to the preamble, the objective is to “replace military confrontation with a new model of security among all States Parties, based on peaceful cooperation, and thus to overcome the division of Europe.” To this end, the States Parties decided to “establish a secure and stable balance of conventional armed forces in Europe at lower levels, remove disparities detrimental to stability and security, and eliminate, as a matter of high priority, the capability to launch a surprise attack or undertake a large-scale offensive action in Europe.” The area of application of the CFE Treaty corresponds to the territories of the signatory states located in Europe, from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains, and includes the European islands of the signatories. The document stipulates caps in the area of application as well as for its geographical sub-areas³. An inspection regime ensures that signatory states comply with the CFE Treaty. This security system implements a regime of transparency, reciprocal inspection, and military openness. Overall, the CFE Treaty is a fundamental element in the security and stability of post-Cold War Europe.

The CFE Treaty entered into force on July 17, 1992, after the resolution of issues raised by the distribution of arms quotas among the successor states of the USSR (Tashkent Agreement, May 15, 1992). The deterioration of the situation in Chechnya and throughout the Caucasus soon posed problems for its implementation. The quota system for the flanks curtailed Russia’s military intervention capabilities in the region, with Article 5 of the treaty limiting the equipment deployed in the geographical area corresponding to the military districts of St. Petersburg and the Caucasus to 1,300 tanks, 1,380 combat vehicles, and 1,680 artillery pieces. On May 15, 1997, an agreement with the United States made it possible to reduce the geographical area of the flanks and raise the caps on weapons that could be deployed there. The treaty was then revised in Istanbul in November 1999 to take into account developments since the breakup of the USSR. During the period leading up to the accession of Central and Eastern European countries to NATO (2004), Russia invoked the CFE Treaty in an attempt to block the accession of the Baltic states. At the first meeting of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) on July 19, 2002, Moscow demanded that the Baltic states sign the CFE Treaty, as Russia sought to prevent the deployment of “foreign military forces” and NATO assets on Baltic territory. Subsequently, at the Extraordinary Conference in Vienna from June 11 to 15, 2007, NATO countries raised the issue of the withdrawal of Russian troops from the separatist provinces of Abkhazia (Georgia) and Transnistria (Moldova) before ratifying the treaty⁴. Russia, for its part, demanded a comprehensive renegotiation that would include the Baltic states and an end to restrictions on Russian military movements “on the flanks” of the former blocs.

On July 14, 2007, Vladimir Putin signed a decree suspending Russia’s participation in the CFE Treaty. In practical terms, Russia no longer considered itself bound to provide information on the level and movement of its troops, nor to authorize inspections of its facilities. The suspension took effect on December 12 of the same year. Subsequently, negotiations aimed at finding common ground between Russia and the West failed, despite the U.S.-Russian reset and NATO’s proposal for a “new framework” (A NATO proposal to Develop a 21^st Century Framework for Strengthening Conventional Arms Control and Transparency in Europe, May 2010). This reflects the profound deterioration in East-West relations and the rift threatening the European continent. In 2015, Russia suspended its participation in the Joint Consultative Group (J.C.G.), the body responsible for issues relating to the CFE Treaty, which met in Vienna, signaling its definitive withdrawal from the CFE Treaty. The organization by Russia and Belarus of large-scale military exercises on the borders of Poland and the Baltic States in September 2017 (Zapad-2017) drew attention to the obsolescence of the CFE Treaty and the failure to comply with the Vienna Document (1990, amended in 2011), a text on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs).

The Vienna Document, signed in 1990, is the text that serves as the basis for discussions between senior representatives of the 56 participating States of the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) to share information on their armed forces, military organization, personnel, weapons systems, and equipment of major importance. Countries also exchange information on their military planning and defense budgets. It is an extension of the confidence- and security-building measures negotiated in parallel with the discussions on conventional forces⁵. The politically binding agreement provides for the exchange and verification of information on armed forces and military activities. The Vienna Document requires participating States to exchange information annually on their military forces, such as deployment plans and budgets, to give prior notification of large-scale military activities, to accept up to three inspections of their military sites per year, and to invite other states to observe certain activities. It also encourages states to allow journalists from all participating states to cover the activities. The Vienna Document has been updated (1992, 1994, 1999, 2011) to take into account the needs of OSCE member states. The latest version introduces a chapter on regional measures that provides a framework for bilateral verification activities. The organization by Russia and Belarus of the Zapad maneuvers in September 2017, and the questions raised by the number of personnel actually involved in these maneuvers (more than 13,000 troops, requiring the presence of foreign observers), draw attention to the fact that the Vienna Document is no longer being heeded⁶.

Conclusion

Russia’s violations of the agreements and treaties negotiated at the end of the Cold War, too often overlooked or downplayed, were harbingers of things to come. Far from being aberrations on a well-oriented curve, these violations demonstrated a desire to challenge the legal and institutional framework established after the end of communism and the breakup of the USSR, before shattering it (which is where we are now). In short, these agreements and treaties were perceived in Russia as a kind of temporary armistice, reflecting a balance of power that needed to be changed before the assault could resume. A parallel can be drawn with the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, signed on March 3, 1918, with the Central Powers (Germany and Austria-Hungary). Lenin had presented this treaty as a tactical pause. Clearly, it was necessary to link the second Chechen war (1999), the war in Georgia (2008), and then the outbreak of the war in Ukraine (2014).

While Moscow is using coercive diplomacy to impose its peace terms on Ukraine, Western leaders, especially Europeans, need to be aware of Russia’s duplicity. Beyond the territorial losses that would have to be recognized, this so-called peace plan provides for a number of restrictive military measures for Ukraine (troop numbers and weapons systems, a ban on foreign military presence and any external aid), while Russia does not comply with any of them. The rise of its military-industrial complex, aided by the hypothetical lifting of international sanctions, would eventually allow it to establish a three- or four-to-one balance of power, paving the way for a new push westward. In reality, the Kremlin is pursuing a “grand strategy” that mobilizes various vectors of power and aims to dominate Europe. If Ukraine were no longer its bulwark, it would be turned into a springboard to the west. 

Jean-Sylvestre Mongrenier

Associate professor of history and geography and researcher at the French Institute of Geopolitics (University of Paris VIII). Author of several books, he works within the Thomas More Institute on geopolitical and defense issues in Europe. His research areas cover the Baltic-Black Sea region, post-Soviet Eurasia, and the Mediterranean.

1. The INF Treaty ended the “Euromissile crisis” that pitted the USSR against NATO in the 1970s and 1980s (the deployment of Pershing II ballistic missiles and Tomahawk cruise missiles in response to the Soviet SS20, SS21, and SS22 missiles).
2. In light of subsequent events, the INF Treaty is closely associated with the end of the USSR, Russia’s retreat to its 17th-Century borders, and the near-bankruptcy of the military-industrial complex in the 1990s.
3. 40,000 battle tanks, 60,000 armored combat vehicles, 40,000 artillery pieces, 13,600 combat aircraft, and 4,000 helicopters.
4. In addition to the base in Gudauta (Abkhazia), Russian troops are also present in Batumi, Akhalkalaki, and Vaziani, as well as on the border between Georgia and Turkey.
5. Negotiations on CFE date back to the first Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), held in Helsinki between 1973 and 1975. The third follow-up meeting, held in Vienna from 1986 to 1989, decided to organize two parallel negotiations, one on CSBMs and the other between the 23 NATO and Warsaw Pact states on conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE). The CSBM negotiations led to the adoption of the Vienna Document in 1990.
6. The 2011 version of the Vienna Document requires notifications for exercises involving more than 9,000 troops and observers for those involving more than 13,000, rules that have been ignored since 2022.