The Election of Donald Trump, the “Pivot” to Asia, and the Europeanization of NATO

Although expected in many respects, the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States raises fears of a new isolationism with destructive effects. At stake in particular is the fate of NATO, whose dereliction — the eminently concrete translation of a geostrategic decoupling between the two shores of the North Atlantic — would open up a space of maneuver favorable to Vladimir Putin’s policy of conquest. However, “nothing can be said to be certain, except death and taxes.” The United States’ European allies need to invest in NATO and, in return for the American military presence in Europe (perhaps reduced over time), participate in the containment of China. 

The election of Donald Trump as President of the United States on November 5, 2024 — against a backdrop of polarization in American political life, to the point of shaking the old foreign policy consensus — and the rise of the People’s Republic of China, are combining to challenge the American focus on Europe. In fact, the strong tensions provoked by Beijing around Taiwan and in the “Asian Mediterranean” (South and East China Seas), notably with the Philippines (a long-standing ally of the United States), and more generally the Chinese government’s desire to oust the Americans from East Asia, and even from the Western Pacific, have led Washington to strengthen its alliances in the region. 

The USA is working to set up an “Asian NATO” (USA, Japan, South Korea) and is strengthening its ties in the Asia-Pacific with Australia and the UK (AUKUS), while providing substantial military aid to Taiwan. In the Indo-Pacific region, the Quad (United States, Japan, Australia, India), occasionally expanded to include other partners (Quad+), opens up the field of cooperation beyond the duly established political-military alliances, in the high-tech and civilian fields. Of course, the question arises as to the future of such a commitment under Trump¹.

As things stand, this overall policy gives rise to fears in Europe that the materialization of the “pivot” toward Asia, announced by President Barack Obama back in 2011, will lead to American disengagement from NATO. Finally, the re-election of Donald Trump to the American presidency and the victory of a Republican Party in his thrall are seen as ushering in a new isolationist era². Vice President James D. Vance embodies this geopolitical option, with Senator Matt Gaetz behind the six-month blockade of U.S. aid to Ukraine. 

In truth, outright isolationism seems impractical in a globalized world in which the United States is still the world’s leading power. As for the prospect of the United States withdrawing from Europe to focus its diplomatic and military efforts on Asia, it remains uncertain. Apart from the fact that Europe constitutes a valuable strategic platform for projecting forces and power into the “greater Mediterranean” (Mediterranean Basin, North Africa, Black Sea, Middle East), and for conducting an active policy in Central Asia, a hypothetical withdrawal from NATO would profoundly alter the global correlation of forces, much to the delight of the hostile revisionist powers³ (the Moscow-Beijing-Tehran axis, supplemented by Pyongyang), with serious consequences in East Asia and the Indo-Pacific region. 

Added to these geostrategic considerations is the fact that the White House, even if it were to embrace the perverse illusion of a “Nixon in reverse⁴“, would have to obtain the support of the U.S. Congress, whose members have passed a resolution requiring a strong qualified majority for Washington to denounce the North Atlantic Treaty (April 4, 1949), the founding treaty of the Atlantic Alliance and its military extension⁵ (NATO). On the other hand, it is quite possible that the United States will invest less in this Euro-Atlantic structure and reallocate part of its military and budgetary resources to Asia-Pacific. Indeed, the U.S. military, under strain, is under the threat of strategic overextension⁶.

It is therefore important for their European allies to increase their spending on armament, perhaps with the financial support of a pooled European budget⁷, and to acquire the crucial military capabilities they lack, in order to compensate for American assets potentially redeployed in the Asia-Pacific. In such a perspective, the post of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) — which has always been held by an American general who is simultaneously Commander-in-Chief of U.S. forces in Europe — should go to a European general from one of the continent’s two nuclear powers, i.e. France and the UK. Other high-level commands could be armed by European allies, but it is imperative that the latter give themselves with the means to do so. 

In short, it would be a matter of Europeanizing NATO (the European pillar of Atlanticism), with the latter remaining backed by the American geopolitical pillar: a form of division of labour (“burden sharing”) which would in turn imply European political, diplomatic and military support for the American policy of containing China in East Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific theater. Beijing’s assertive power, geopolitical revisionism and ambitions are not a distant Asia-Pacific issue. Claimed by the People’s Republic of China, the “Asian Mediterranean” (South and East China Seas) handles over a third of world trade, and even two-fifths of trade between Asia and Europe. 

Added to this is France’s visible presence in the Indo-Pacific region, both in territorial terms (overseas departments and territories) and maritime terms (90% of the French maritime domain, the second largest in the world). As a counterpart to the United States’ ongoing involvement in Europe, which is likely to be scaled down, support for its Indo-Pacific strategy corresponds to the security and power interests of both France and Europe, which cannot live freely and prosper without opening up to the open sea. What’ is more, the People’s Republic of China is deploying its power and influence on Europe’s borders, from the Arctic to the Mediterranean. 

To conclude, it is important that American political leaders, diplomats, and military personnel keep in mind the geopolitical uniqueness of their nation. In geostrategic terms, the United States is comparable to a large island-continent, protected to the east and west by two oceans, the Atlantic and the Pacific⁸. This gives it some security, although the tragic situations in Central and South America are catching up with it (narco-trafficking and illegal migratory flows). On the other hand, they are far removed from the immense Eurasian mass where most of the world’s population, production centers and wealth are located, that “Eurasia” where global power relations are being redefined. 

If Moscow and Beijing, with the support of their tributaries and clients, succeeded in taking control of Eurasia, the global correlation of forces would be turned upside down. Locked within the confines of a “Western hemisphere” whose destinies elude the United States (see the anti-American Bolivarian axis), it would be deprived of full access to the common goods on which it bases its power and prosperity. Undoubtedly, the challenges of our times call for a renegotiation of the “terms of trade” between America and its allies. But the capitals of the West and the free world should not lose sight of what is essential. Otherwise, the United States would turn into a “super Brazil”, with no influence on the course of the world, and Europe would become a “small cape” in Asia. 

Jean-Sylvestre Mongrenier

Associate professor of history and geography and researcher at the French Institute of Geopolitics (University of Paris VIII). Author of several books, he works within the Thomas More Institute on geopolitical and defense issues in Europe. His research areas cover the Baltic-Black Sea region, post-Soviet Eurasia, and the Mediterranean.

1. See Laure Mandeville, “Les stratèges trumpistes annoncent une ère plus reaganienne qu’isolationniste,” Le Figaro, August 30, 2024
2. See Jean-Sylvestre Mongrenier, “Un spectre hante l’Europe: l’isolationnisme américain,” October 31, 2024
3. See Jean-Sylvestre Mongrenier, “The Sino-Russian axis an dits extensions : the Challenge of Naming Reality,” Desk Russie, October 10, 2024.
4. The “Nixon in reverse” theme emerged in 2016 during Donald Trump’s previous presidential campaign. The guiding idea is to untie Russian and Chinese interests, reversing the approach of US President Richard Nixon, who, advised by Henry Kissinger, led a US-Chinese rapprochement directed against the USSR in the early 1970s. In its hegemonic struggle with the People’s Republic of China, the United States would benefit from conciliating with Russia. This diplomatic-strategic option was promoted by Dimitri K. Simes, a Russian pseudo-dissident, director of the Center for the National Interest and editor of The National Interest magazine. Simes had profoundly perverted a section of the American right that had now embraced Slavic-Orthodox kitsch. In 2022, Simes brought down his game and returned to Russia, where he was praised by the regime; he now runs riot on Channel One Russia TV channel. Simes is prosecuted by the US Department of Justice for his anti-American activities.
5. On November 14, 2023, the U.S.Congress voted in favor of legislation to prevent any president from unilaterally withdrawing the U.S. from NATO. The final vote was largely bipartisan (310/118).
6. See Elise Vincent, “L’armée américaine au défi de la multiplication des guerres,” Le Monde, January 12, 2024,
7. High Representative of the European Union, former Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas advocates a European loan of 100 billion euros.
8. See Laure Mandeville’s interview with Andrew Mitcha, “Il est dans l’intérêt vital de l’Amérique de ne pas laisser une puissance agressive dominer l’Europe,” Le Figaro, September 27, 2024