Standing Together From the Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific

Emmanuel Macron, invited to deliver the opening speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on May 30, presented France and Europe as a “third way,” thus creating a false symmetry between America on the one hand and the Sino-Russian axis on the other. At a time when the Trump presidency’s missteps are opening up new horizons for powers seeking to drive the final nail into the coffin of the West, the French president, 70 years after the Bandung Conference (April 18-24, 1955), seems to want to resurrect “non-alignment.” While we understand Europe’s need to assert itself, Gaullist rhetoric is not entirely convincing. The Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theaters are interconnected; the Allies need to stand together in political, strategic, and military harmony.

On the face of it, the Trump administration’s missteps cannot be seen as confirmation of a historical inevitability that would automatically lead to geostrategic decoupling between the two sides of the North Atlantic. As things stand, NATO remains in place, major exercises are proceeding as normal, and the Pentagon plans to strengthen northern Europe, where military and strategic contradictions are growing. While unofficial sources suggested that the United States would voluntarily refrain from appointing an American general to the post of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), the Pentagon has just appointed General Alexus Grynkewich, who is set to take up his duties in August, following Senate approval. At the same time, the general review of U.S. deployments is continuing. It will most likely lead to a reduction in U.S. military personnel in Europe, but informed observers emphasize the seriousness of this work, which is being carried out without haste and without any sign of doctrinaire thinking.

“Burden sharing” rather than “burden shifting”?

With the Hague summit (June 24-25, 2025) just a few days away, the prospect of a rebalancing of military commitments and responsibilities between the two sides of the North Atlantic seems to be winning out over that of the United States’ withdrawal from NATO¹. In short, “burden sharing” rather than “burden shifting”². However, the U.S.’s European allies should not give in to cowardly relief. The effort they need to make is significant and long-term: military and security spending in Europe will have to reach the target of 5% of GDP, according to the objective that will be set in The Hague. The financial situation of several European countries, including France, and the need to rationalize these efforts is leading to some “creative” accounting: relaxation of budgetary criteria in the eurozone, a European defense fund and a rearmament plan from the European Commission, and a reorientation of the European Investment Bank, a “NATO bank,” among other proposals³.

Beyond these aspects, efforts will have to be translated into the deployment of troops and military capabilities on the ground. They also imply that European allies will have to create new command positions within NATO. In the Nordic-Baltic region, as in the Pontic-Mediterranean basin, enhanced cooperation between European nations will respond to the hybrid warfare that Russia is waging in these areas, testing their resolve and defense systems. In this reshaping of the Euro-Atlantic system, the United States would retain an important role (extended nuclear deterrence, airspace protection, strategic transport, electronic warfare, and intelligence), but it would have to reallocate some of its budgetary resources and military capabilities to the Indo-Pacific region, in the face of China that considers the Asian Mediterranean (the South and East China Seas) as its own and that is not far from laying claim to the Western Pacific⁴ (the Guam base is in the sights of the People’s Liberation Army).

From a European perspective, it would be wrong to think that “burden sharing” within NATO will not involve concessions in the Indo-Pacific region. Admittedly, Russia’s large-scale military aggression in Ukraine and the shadow cast by the Russian threat over the Euro-Atlantic area, well beyond the Baltic states, Poland and Romania, rule out NATO’s “China turn” that was discussed in the recent past. Nevertheless, faced with the Sino-Russian alliance⁵, as evidenced by China’s multifaceted support for the Kremlin’s war, China’s attempt to seize the Asian Mediterranean (even larger than the Mediterranean Sea), and the threats to freedom of navigation faced by Western nations, these nations cannot consider this space as a distant and exotic theater. One need only look at a map of the world from the North Pole to see the interconnection between the Euro-Atlantic and Asian theaters, linked by the Northern Sea Route along the Russian coast.

In short, NATO could survive Trumpism, but some of the United States’ European allies will have to invest even more in protecting the shipping lanes between Europe and Asia, freedom of navigation, and the security of the straits that are essential for the movement of ships, and even the protection of territories, territorial waters, and exclusive economic zones for those who are physically present in this part of the world. This is the case for France, a power bordering the Indo-Pacific whose geopolitical room for maneuver depends on maintaining strong relations with the United States and continuing concrete bilateral military cooperation, primarily naval⁶. The French president may well play the non-alignment card, but this will not go beyond stratagems and public diplomacy, without changing anything fundamentally. Unless the European Union, under France’s leadership, transforms itself into a global geostrategic player, which would be a bold move.

Toward a pan-European political-military pillar

However, the scenario of “burden sharing” within NATO may not apply to Ukraine: the idea that financial and military-industrial support should come from European allies seems to be gaining ground in the United States, across party lines (the U.S. Secretary of Defense did not attend the latest Ramstein conference). In such a scenario, it would be purely and simply a case of “burden shifting,” with the burden passing to Europe. However, it is important that Ukraine, which remains undefeated, continues to do so, as it constitutes Europe’s first line of defense, east of the borders of the Euro-Atlantic community. In quantitative terms, European countries already provide just over half of this aid, but replacing the United States entirely will be costly; the task will require political and budgetary battles to be fought both within each state and at European Union level⁷.

Furthermore, European countries do not have all the resources necessary to provide military and industrial support to Ukraine (arsenals and stocks of weapons and ammunition). A compromise will have to be found with the United States, even if it means using European funds to finance deliveries of American equipment and ammunition, until the Old Continent’s arms industry reaches the required production levels (which are increasing, albeit slowly). The simplest solution in the short term would be to confiscate Russian assets to finance such acquisitions. As for the prospect of deploying European military forces in Ukraine, this seems unlikely, as a ceasefire is highly unlikely, a fortiori a peace agreement, whose implementation would have to be guaranteed. However, a sudden change in the military situation could require such a deployment. In the event of a collapse of the Ukrainian front—which is not on the cards—the allies would be forced to form a security zone in front of the eastern borders of the Euro-Atlantic community⁸.

Finally, while the perpetuation of NATO, at the cost of “burden sharing” between the two sides of the North Atlantic, would be a good thing, it should not give rise to excessive optimism. In fact, the conflict with Russia is taking on the appearance of a perpetual war – at least a kind of Hundred Years’ War, which began in 1945 and was interrupted by a 15-year “armistice” after the fall of the “Iron Curtain” — that is, a long-running conflict that only a new Russian “Katastroika” (fall of the regime) could interrupt. From then on, many developments and reversals are possible, especially since a war in the Asian Mediterranean and the Pacific theater would have consequences at the other end of the Eurasian landmass. The Eurasian concept has therefore not lost its relevance.

To conclude

What is more, the Trump presidency’s missteps continue to worry the markets, the governments of allied countries, and the Western diplomatic and strategic establishment, jeopardizing the unity and strength of the West. Of course, we have no doubt that there are still “good people” working in the Pentagon and the State Department. Within the administration itself, a few figures are seeking to mitigate the shortcomings of the chief executive and offset the effects of unfortunate decisions. The fact remains that American society no longer appears to be politically structured. The public (digital) clash between Donald Trump and Elon Musk, as well as the breakdown of the ruling coalition of MAGA and high-tech billionaires, reveal the extent of the disaster. However, the lack of clear and wise leadership threatens the very financial and monetary foundations of the United States’ power (loss of confidence in the dollar and U.S. Treasury bonds), which is heavily indebted. This could have serious consequences for its military projection abroad if the geopolitical option of “great entrenchment” were to prevail.

The alliance with the United States must therefore be maintained, provided that Donald Trump is not overtaken by his “shadow” (in the Jungian sense of the term) at the next NATO summit. It is necessary because it is beneficial, but this does not mean that European governments should give up their military independence, a goal that is in line with the latest U.S. demands. In accordance with the “balancing concept” forged in his time by George Kennan, the theorist of containment, the project should be that of a North American pillar and a pan-European pillar, united by a re-balanced alliance, pillars capable of functioning independently of each other if necessary. In other words, the challenge for European states and their Ukrainian ally is to rise to the challenges and threats so that they can cope, even if the United States becomes mired in its internal contradictions. In such a case, the Westerners of the Old World would have to fight to regain the position they held on the eve of the great “European civil war” between 1914 and 1945.

1. For more information on this Atlantic summit, see the NATO website.
2. The issue of “burden sharing” is a recurring theme in the history of transatlantic and inter-allied relations. Announced on July 25, 1969, by President Nixon against the backdrop of the Vietnam War, the Guam Doctrine (or Nixon Doctrine) stipulated that the United States would support allied countries that were victims of aggression, but would prioritize financial, material, and logistical aid over direct engagement. The Nixon-Kissinger duo was then preparing for U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. This doctrine contained the idea of “burden sharing.” Although focused on the Asia-Pacific region, it greatly concerned the United States’ European allies. The issue of a new American isolationism and a possible withdrawal of the United States from international affairs is at the heart of Raymond Aron’s analysis in La république impériale : les États-Unis et le monde. 1945-1972 (The Imperial Republic: The United States and the World, 1945-1972), Calmann-Lévy, 1973.
3. “European defense: an €800 billion plan to rearm Europe,” Vie publique, March 5, 2025.
4. It is true that the United States is threatened with “strategic overextension” between Europe and Asia, as containing China requires significant military resources. On the consequences of the phenomenon of “strategic overextension” in the diplomatic and strategic history of nations and empires, see Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, Random House, 1987.
5. The density of Sino-Russian relations exceeds what some call simple “collusion” or “connivance,” i.e., a “secret agreement to the detriment of a third party” (definition from the Larousse dictionary). In fact, these terms date back to the 2000s, when the Sino-Russian axis and its allies were likened to a “syndicate of malcontents,” grumpy old men with no real influence on world affairs.
6. See, for example, the “Clémenceau-2025” mission, the first carried out by the aircraft carrier Charles-de-Gaulle and its escort in the Indo-Pacific region, which demonstrates France’s ambitions. In partnership with the U.S. Seventh Fleet and the navies of regional partners, the French carrier strike group braved the tyranny of distance and the turbulence of the intertropical zone to assert the high value Paris places on freedom of navigation and the security of straits. Conducted with eight other countries, the “La Pérouse” exercise took place in the Indonesian straits (Strait of Malacca, Sunda Strait, and Lombok Strait). Even more significantly, the French naval aviation group, together with the U.S. and Japanese navies, conducted the “Pacific Steller” exercise off Luzon, an island in the Philippines near Taiwan.
7. In terms of armaments, the United States accounts for a quarter of the Ukrainian army’s supplies, with Europe and the Ukrainian arms industry now providing half of these supplies.
8. It is within the framework of a vast pan-European geopolitical complex, stretching from the Arctic to the Mediterranean and from the Atlantic to the Tanais (the Don basin), that Europe’s defense must be conceived, designed, and organized, with countries outside the European Union such as the United Kingdom, Norway, and—on the southeastern flank of this Pan-Europe—Turkey, whose representatives participated in the meetings of the “coalition of volunteers.”