Regarding the Washington Summit: A Plea to NATO

From the perspective of the war in Ukraine, the Washington Summit (July 9-11, 2024) is not entirely satisfactory: the Allies could not agree on a timeline to fulfill the promise of membership made to Ukraine (the declaration speaks of an “irreversible path”). Moreover, concerns about the health of U.S. President Joe Biden raise fears of Donald Trump’s election in November, a flamboyant survivor of an assassination attempt. Therefore, is NATO at risk of being discarded? Let us not jeopardize the future of this alliance, which remains necessary and crucial.

At first glance, it is good that NATO should replace the “Ramstein coalition,” an ad hoc group of about fifty states that, under the direction and impetus of the United States, ensures the supply of arms to Ukraine. Until recent months, the Allies preferred to set NATO aside to minimize the visibility and involvement of the organization in the war in Ukraine¹. In the future, NATO and its members will lead an “initiative” to coordinate and deliver weapons as well as train Ukrainian soldiers (Berlin has dismissed the term “mission”). At the Washington summit, the Allies agreed on an initial annual budget of $40 billion, in addition to the $50 billion allocated within the G7 framework.

Strengthening NATO Structures

The mobilization of NATO acknowledges the existential nature of the war in Ukraine for Europe’s defense and its significant implications on other geopolitical theaters, crucial for the United States and their allies, from the Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific. The idea is also to rely on a stable and proven politico-military framework, while a provisional coalition is far too sensitive to the vagaries of national political circumstances, especially when the outcome of the forthcoming American election could challenge the “hegemon” status of the current leader of the Ramstein coalition.

NATO and its member states thus commit for the long term, as shown by the slow but continuous reinforcement of the “eastern flank” (a more appropriate term would be “eastern front”) since Russia’s forcible seizure of Crimea and the onset of hybrid warfare in Donbas (2014). From the Baltic to the Black Sea, the countries most exposed to the Russian threat (the Baltic States, Poland, Romania) host new inter-allied military forces and their war equipment, under the protection of theater defense intended to be strengthened (anti-aircraft and anti-missile systems). The idea of airspace protection that would extend to the western and southwestern parts of Ukraine, or even to Moldova, needs to be promoted.

After years of denial regarding the emergence of a new Russian threat — NATO had been rethought as an expeditionary model (the “war on terror”) — strategic planning in the East has resumed. The defense plans adopted last year at the Vilnius summit (July 1-12, 2023) are tested through large maneuvers, with the command structure and the required force system evolving accordingly. The planning takes into account the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO, an enlargement that provides strategic depth to the Baltic States and strengthens allied positions in the Baltic region. The military integration of the Baltic-Scandinavian region will also have effects in the Far North and the Arctic.

In the immediate future, the agreement between Washington and Berlin on the next deployment of American deep-strike systems (2026?), on German soil, is a positive initiative. These would be Tomahawk cruise missiles, SM-6, and hypersonic weapons, with a range exceeding 500 kilometers. The course of the war in Ukraine shows the importance of these “deep fires,” capable of striking command centers, logistical hubs, and so-called “critical” (i.e., strategic) enemy infrastructures. Some experts recall the “Euromissiles battle,” initiated by the USSR in 1977 with the deployment of SS-20 missiles targeting Western Europe (highly precise nuclear weapons at the time). NATO then made a “dual-track decision”: to demand the withdrawal of SS-20s and, in case of Soviet refusal, deploy more precise American missiles (Tomahawk and Pershing II). The SS-20s were the starting point of a new showdown in the “Fifty-Year War” (the first Cold War) between East and West.

Clearly, the two situations do not overlap, as the new American weapon systems in question are equipped with conventional warheads. The tactical and operational logic of such a deployment resonates more with the Rogers Doctrine of the early 1980s²: providing the means to strike the second echelon of the enemy force system to prevent a victorious battle in Central Europe. The issue is currently is to correct the balance of power, as European allies lack the required capabilities to counter the Russian strike systems flaunted by Kremlin propaganda (Iskander missiles and hypersonic devices). This initiative will be a concrete contribution to Europe’s defense.

NATO’s Global Dimension

Some criticize NATO for including the Chinese “systemic challenge” (the term threat is avoided) and the security interests of the Asia-Pacific. Indeed, the subject of China is gaining importance (it appears in the Madrid Strategic Concept adopted in 2022); friendly countries in East Asia (Japan, South Korea) and Oceania (Australia, New Zealand) were invited to Washington, angering the Chinese government. This is not a “distraction.” On the one hand, it would be unreasonable to expect the United States to continue its European engagement while signaling that the Indo-Pacific is not our concern. On the other hand, Europe’s security and prosperity largely depends on freedom of navigation and control of communication lines in spaces threatened by China.

Finally, the Sino-Russian axis and the revisionist front it leads can no longer be ignored under the pretext of “constructive ambiguities.” This global conflict spans from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and European allies of the United States cannot shirk without facing severe repercussions. NATO and its European members are certainly not best positioned to wield influence in the region, but China projects its power and ambitions in Europe and the “greater Mediterranean.” On the eve of the Washington summit, Beijing was even conducting military exercises in Belarus, near Ukraine and NATO³.

Thus, it is important to develop political, diplomatic, and military ties with Asia-Pacific democracies through NATO or other cooperation frameworks (see the Indo-Pacific Quad, sometimes expanded into a “Quad+”). Either international affairs will be structured along an Atlantic/Indo-Pacific geopolitical axis (the United States, Europe, and their Asia-Pacific allies), or global balances will tip in favor of a Sino-centric Asia, with “Russia-Eurasia” following China’s lead, a policy consciously embraced by Vladimir Putin, whom Russian propagandists shamelessly compare to Alexander Nevsky, tasked with collecting tribute in ancient Rus’ for the Mongol Empire (just as Muscovy prevailed in the Eastern Slavic world, Putin’s Chinese pivot leads directly to Russia’s vassalization).

If the provincialization of European minds breaks with the historical primacy of the West, the “Trump danger” raises many questions about America’s willingness to maintain its Western leadership. Return to isolationism? During Donald Trump’s presidential term (2016-2020), some analysts spoke of unilateralism, a redefinition of geostrategic priorities, and a desire to share the “burden” (burden-sharing). Another concept was used to give meaning, in both the sense of significance and direction, to Trumpism and its international implications: Jacksonian isolationism.

NATO in the Face of America’s “Jacksonian Moment”

The expression “Jacksonian moment” refers to the seventh President of the United States (1829-1837). In an interview with CNN on May 1, 2016, Fareed Zakaria was the first to draw a parallel between Donald Trump and Andrew Jackson: “Donald Trump,” he stated, “is a Jacksonian. Jackson represents a typically populist style of American thought, different from other political traditions in the country.” Internationally, this populist current combines isolationism and unilateralism: “Jacksonians,” Fareed Zakaria explained, “are not so much exasperated by enemies as by our allies.”

Historian and political scientist Walter Russel Mead identified Jacksonian isolationism as one of the traditions influencing American diplomacy, alongside Hamiltonians (a Realpolitik before its time), Jeffersonians (peaceful isolationism), and Wilsonians (idealistic internationalism). President Andrew Jackson gave rise to a tradition characterized by sovereignty, a restrictive definition of national interests, unilateralism, and the importance of military force⁴. Regarding the parallel between Donald Trump and Andrew Jackson, one may refer to Richard White, the author of “Trump’s Jacksonian Moment” in the Boston Review (January 7, 2017). However, John Bolton, Trump’s former National Security Advisor, considers this scholarly approach to Trumpism futile. In “The Room Where It Happened,” he emphasizes Trump’s lack of political philosophy, sheer opportunism, and, in the former president’s mind, reducing strategic problems and geopolitical issues to an “art of the deal” meant to highlight his genius.

In short, Trumpism would not be a neo-Jacksonian isolationism but an egotistical projection of Donald Trump on the international stage⁵. As dramatic lines converge in Eurasia — from Ukraine to the Taiwan Strait, to Korea, and on the “Middle Eastern isthmus” (a possible open war with Iran) — such a diagnosis is worrisome. Especially since Donald Trump has chosen James D. Vance as his running mate and potential political heir; the senator from Ohio is not known for being particularly focused on America’s allies. In the immediate future, Trump’s latest statements about the island state of Taiwan, which was urged to settle the bill for American support, show that there has been no conversion. They call to mind those made in South Carolina in February 2024, regarding European countries threatened to be handed over to Russia if they did not increase their military effort.

On this question, as on others, it is important to be stoic, to distinguish what depends on us from what does not (please forgive this reductive interpretation). European allies have no control over American domestic politics, and in these times of general upheaval, it would be imprudent to rely solely on the resilience of existing structures and established relations with the American diplomatic and military establishment. Conversely, the withdrawal of the United States from NATO and the repatriation of American troops remain difficult to conceive, as they would go against their basic strategic interests: the Eurasian landmass would be left to the geopolitical maneuvers of the Sino-Russian axis, with effects on the global balance of power and the increased risk of a great war, from which it would be difficult to extricate oneself⁶. However, it is true that diplomatic and military history is full of major political and strategic errors.

In any case, European nations must make a much greater defense effort to build within the Western world a continental military pillar (the 2%-of-GDP threshold should be a minimum). In addition to the necessary defense of Europe against the predatory actions of Russia-Eurasia, backed by Chinese power, this military pillar would give them more power and influence in their relations and negotiations with the United States. According to the Book of Wisdom, attributed to King Solomon, is the world not “measure, number, and weight”?

It would unfortunately be risky to believe in a transfer of power and competencies between NATO and the European Union, with the latter seen as replacing the former and thus assuming the defense of Europe. NATO remains indispensable, and its hypothetical disbandment would have grave consequences for the European Union, this pan-European Commonwealth lacking a hegemonic actor capable of federating good will and maintaining cohesion (see the theory of the “hegemonic stabilizer,” foreshadowed by the works of Charles Kindleberger⁷). It is not certain that the “European construction” would withstand the shock.

To Conclude

In truth, it is important to work toward a degree of Europeanization of NATO, with the European allies of the United States assuming a greater share of the defense of the Euro-Atlantic area, including aid to Ukraine (Europe is already doing a lot). This implies budgets and capacities that will compensate not for the withdrawal of the United States, but for their partial redeployment, which is inevitable: Beijing’s actions in the Taiwan Strait and the Asian Mediterranean (South and East China Seas), and those of Iran in the Middle East, challenge the United States. Not to mention a possible conflagration in Korea.

In return for this “burden-sharing,” which would allow the United States to overcome the perils of strategic overstretch, NATO members could agree on a reform that would assign the position of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) to a European general officer. As things stand, this general scheme is little more than a regulatory idea, but it is urgent that it guide the efforts of European nations. Let them continuously increase their military capabilities and their effective contribution to NATO, and the rest will be given to them as well.

1. The “Ramstein coalition”, led by the United States, was established in the weeks following the Russian “special operation” on February 24, 2022. It operates from a major German airbase made available to the American armed forces. The Ramstein coalition comprises around fifty countries that identify the needs of the Ukrainian armed forces, inventory the available stocks in the willing countries, and, in a way, ensure the meeting of supply and demand. When qualitative thresholds need to be crossed in the delivery of military equipment, other coalitions take shape: a “Leopard coalition” of countries willing to deliver heavy tanks, led by Warsaw; an “F-16 coalition” for fighter jets, with London and The Hague at the helm; a “munition coalition,” and so on. With the “initiative” to coordinate the delivery of weapons and training of Ukrainian soldiers, NATO becomes the platform for international military support to Ukraine, with the general objective being long-term commitment.
2. American General Bernard Rogers was, from 1979 to 1987, “Supreme Allied Commander Europe” (SACEUR). The “Rogers Doctrine” was the extension within NATO of the American AirLand Battle concept. In the event of Soviet aggression in Central Europe, the said doctrine advocated for attacking the second echelon forces (Follow-on Forces Attack or FOFA) of the Warsaw Pact to be able to win the frontline battle. It relied on the use of high-tech and highly precise conventional weapons (“smart weapons”).
3. See Harold Thibaut and Faustine Vincent, “On NATO’s doorstep, China and Belarus hold symbolic military exercise,” Le Monde, July 11, 2024.
4. See Walter Russel Mead, “Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World,” Odile Jacob, 2003. By the same author, see also “America’s Jacksonian Turn. The assassination attempt gives new power to an old political tendency,” Wall Street Journal, July 14, 2024.
5. See John Bolton, “The Room Where It Happened,” Talents Editions, 2024.
6. A law passed in December 2023 stipulates that any potential American withdrawal from NATO could not occur without a two-thirds majority vote in the Senate.
7. See Pierre Buhler, “Defense: The Autonomous Management of its Security by the European Union is a Leap into the Unknown,” Le Monde, March 19, 2024.